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FRENEMIES OF THE COURT: THE MANY FACES OF
AMICUS CURIAE
Helen A. Anderson *
INTRODUCTION
Ask any lawyer what an ―amicus curiae‖ is, and you will be told
that the term means ―friend of the court.‖1 The term has positive,
even warm, connotations. Amicus briefs provide additional information or perspectives to assist courts in deciding issues of public
importance. Interest groups, law professors, and politically engaged lawyers are happy to participate in important cases
through such briefs. Amicus curiae participation is defended as
democratic input into what is otherwise not a democratic branch
of government.2
Yet, amici curiae—nonparties who are nevertheless advocates,
who are not bound by rules of standing and justiciability, or even
rules of evidence, and who can present the court with new information and arguments—occupy a unique place in the appellate

* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to
thank her colleagues at the University of Washington School of Law who attended a
presentation of this article, and especially Thomas Cobb, Lisa Manheim, Kate O‘Neill,
Kathy McGinnis, Zahr Said, and David Ziff for their excellent suggestions. Elizabeth Porter read a draft and provided much expertise and encouragement. The author also wishes
to thank the participants at the West Coast Rhetoric Workshop at the William S. Boyd
School of Law (2012), and, in particular, Linda Edwards and Jeanne Moreno for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―amicus curiae‖ and also
noting ―friend of the court‖ as an alternative term).
2. See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 315, 319–20 (2008); Ryan Salzman, Christopher J. Williams & Bryan T. Calvin,
The Determinants of the Number of Amicus Briefs Filed Before the U.S. Supreme Court,
1953–2001, 32 JUST. SYS. J. 293, 294–95 (2011); Omari Scott Simmons, Picking Friends
from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Political Symbolism, 42 CONN. L. REV. 185, 190
(2009).
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courts.3 Amicus briefs have the potential to exert significant influence on a decision, despite their ―delusive innocuousness.‖4
Amicus curiae participation has surged in recent years, primarily by interest and advocacy groups wishing to advance their law
5
reform efforts and to gain publicity. In addition, government
agencies, officials, law professors, law clinics, individual lawyers,
and even high school students have all added their arguments to
6
those of the litigating parties. Yet the category of amicus curiae
remains largely unexamined, and little attention is paid to the
very different roles amici can play. In some ways, the very term
7
amicus—friend—has obscured the full effect of these changes.
This article creates a taxonomy of amici curiae that allows for a
clearer analysis of the advantages and potential drawbacks of
amicus participation. Rather than categorizing amici curiae by
the types of arguments made, as some scholars have done, this
taxonomy categorizes amici by their relationships to the court
and the parties.8 This article also looks beyond the Supreme
3. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal
Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency and Adversarialism, 27 REV. LITIG. 669, 675
(2008).
4. Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J.
694, 694 (1963) (referencing ―delusive innocuous‖ in the context of the amicus brief‘s
―seemingly static function and . . . offhand manner of . . . use in court‖).
5. See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus
Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 807, 810–11,
825–26 (2004).
6. See Patricia Montemurri, Ann Arbor Teen’s Legal Brief: Juvenile Lifers Deserve a
2nd Chance, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 17, 2014, 11:11 AM), http://www.freep.com/articl
e/20140217/NEWS06/302170018/Juvenile-Lifer-Catholic-Ann-Arbor-student-brief (describing a high school student‘s amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Michigan). See generally
Tony Mauro, Bench Pressed, AM. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 85 (discussing the surge in amicus
briefs in the Supreme Court of the United States).
7. Would courts be so welcoming to amicus curiae of every stripe if we called most of
them, as the Canadians do, ―interveners?‖ Canadian courts use the term ―amicus curiae‖
to mean someone who has been asked by the court to provide a viewpoint which the court
believes is necessary. See John Koch, Making Room: New Directions in Third Party Intervention, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 151, 157 & n.26 (1990). In Canada, the term ―intervener‖ means someone who has asked to file a brief. See Rules of the Supreme Court of
Canada, Rules 55–59, SOR/2002-156 (Can. 2014) (listing the requirements for intervening
in Canada). Groups or persons seeking to intervene must show their interest in the litigation and that their submission will be ―useful and different‖ from the other submissions in
the case. Edward Clark, The Needs of the Many and the Needs of the Few: A New System of
Public Interest Intervention for New Zealand, 36 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 71, 84
(2005) (describing the Canadian system and arguing for a similar system in New Zealand).
8. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 2, at 203–09 (analyzing amicus curiae participation
in terms of its function and role in argument rather than its relationship to the court); see
also Nancy Bage Sorenson, Comment, The Ethical Implications of Amicus Briefs: A Proposal for Reforming Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY‘S L.J.
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Court of the United States—the focus of most scholarly writing on
amicus curiae—and examines amicus practice in all appellate
courts.
When amici curiae are considered in light of their relationship
to the court and the disputants, five major types emerge.9 These
include lawyers appointed to argue a particular issue, groups or
persons invited by the court to provide their perspective, those
who advocate for one side of the dispute, those who support neither party, and those who just missed qualifying as intervenors
yet have a stake in the outcome. These types can be called the
―Court‘s Lawyer,‖ the ―Invited Friend,‖ the ―Friend of a Party,‖
the ―Independent Friend,‖ and the ―Near Intervenor.‖ Of these
types, the Friend of a Party category of amicus curiae has grown
most numerous in recent decades. In addition, federal, state, and
local governments—especially the attorneys or solicitors general—enjoy favored amicus status in appellate courts, even as
10
they may participate in the ways outlined above. All of these
roles do not sit comfortably together in one category. Yet, until
now, the differences in amicus curiae participation have remained largely unexamined.
The failure to recognize the different roles has led to occasional
frustration and incoherent analysis, primarily around the question of ―interest.‖ A myth persists that amicus curiae should be
disinterested; that its only duty should be to assist the court—as
the name ―friend of the court‖ implies11—even though historically
there was no such requirement.12 Yet of the types of amici outlined above, only the Court‘s Lawyer can be said not to have any
interest of its own. On the one hand, courts recognize this reality;
1219, 1245 (1999) (discussing the four basic functions of amicus briefs in Texas).
9. See infra Part II for a detailed discussion of each amicus curiae type.
10. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 210–14.
11. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. (―[A]micus curiae should keep in mind the
purpose of an amicus brief. As the name implies, an amicus curiae brief should assist the
Court, not advocate a particular litigant‘s case.‖). See infra Part IV.A.
12. See e.g., Funbus Systems, Inc., v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm‘n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1125
(9th Cir. 1986) (―Moreover, we have stated that there is no rule that amici must be totally
disinterested.‖); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982) (―There is no rule,
however, that amici be totally disinterested.‖); see also Krislov, supra note 4, at 703–04
(discussing the function, not requirement, of amicus briefs in the early 20th century, and
discussing the evolution of amicus curiae from neutrality to its contemporary role of partisanship); Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the
Party Begin After the Friends Leave? 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1254 (1992) (noting that
when amicus curiae participation emerged on the federal level, it was not simply ―an impartial judicial servant‖).
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on the other hand, they sometimes complain that amici curiae do
not behave as true friends of the court.
Again, the term amicus—friend—seems to obscure the reality
of amicus curiae participation today. The real question is not
whether amici should be interested, but what legitimate interests
may justify amicus curiae participation. How that question is answered depends in part upon the court‘s conception of its own
role.
The Supreme Court of the United States has helped the cause
of amicus curiae considerably with its open door policy for amicus
briefs. But beyond the Supreme Court, some lower federal courts
and state appellate courts wrestle with the inherent contradictions of amicus participation. Judge Richard Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is a particularly
prominent critic of amicus briefs. He has stated, ―The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants‘ briefs, in effect merely extending the length of the litigant‘s brief.‖13 And yet, despite
occasional complaints, the role of amici curiae remains barely examined or restrained. In large part this may be because courts
have no obligation toward amici: if an amicus brief is not helpful,
the court can simply ignore it.14
Much academic ink has been spilt on the study of amicus curiae in the Supreme Court of the United States. Scholars have
chronicled the dramatic rise in amicus participation in the
Court,15 lauded this participation as democratic input that contributes to the Court‘s legitimacy, and otherwise extolled the
Court‘s welcoming attitude.16 Political scientists have also attempted to measure the influence of this ―rising tide‖ of amicus
briefs.17 Additionally, academics themselves are regular authors
of amicus briefs.18
13. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir.
1997).
14. See Mauro, supra note 6, at 85 (discussing how Supreme Court Justices often skip
over many filed amicus briefs).
15. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000); Krislov, supra note 4, at
716.
16. See Garcia, supra note 2, at 319–20; Simmons, supra note 2, at 199–202.
17. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 749, 751–52, 789.
18. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338
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More recently, critiques of amicus curiae participation have
been heard, again focused on the Supreme Court. Some criticize
the sheer volume of amicus briefs, some question whether agencies are using amicus briefs to evade rule-making procedures, and
some question the Court‘s use of amicus curiae for factual re19
search or as a way around the adversarial process.
But the Supreme Court is unique. Parties are well-represented;
even those without means will be represented by very competent
volunteers eager for the experience and publicity. The Court generally addresses issues of wide applicability and welcomes the in20
put of certain amici curiae.
Other courts, however, may not be able to entertain as many
friends as the Supreme Court. The federal courts of appeals are
high-volume courts and may be more sensitive to an increase in
their workload, or what might be perceived as meddling by interest groups.21 State courts may have an additional concern: more
than half of state high courts are sensitive to democratic pressures through the election of judges.22 As a result, lobbying of
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (―Out of 22 amicus briefs, only two—filed by dueling
groups of law professors—addressed the issue on the merits.‖).
19. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Regulation by Amicus: The Department of
Labor’s Policy Making in the Courts, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1223, 1223–31 (2013) (undertaking
the investigation of amicus briefs as a means of evading rule-making procedures and its
consequent effect on worker protection statutes); Brian P. Goldman, Note, Should the Supreme Court Stop Inviting Amici Curiae to Defend Abandoned Lower Court Decisions?, 63
STAN. L. REV. 907, 909–11 (2011) (challenging the Court‘s alleged interference with the
adversarial system through its discretion to appoint amicus curiae); Brianne J. Gorod, The
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 3–5, 7 (2011)
(questioning amicus curiae participation as a means for obtaining off-the-record facts
which were not tested under adversarial adjudication); Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble
with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5–7), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2409071 (similarly challenging the introduction of off-the-record
facts); Simard, supra note 3, at 700 (discussing Justice Ginsburg‘s belief that the sheer
volume of briefs might cause the Court to miss a ―gem‖ fact or argument laid out in one
brief).
20. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 761–62, 764.
21. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 19, at 35–36 (describing increased amicus curiae participation and courts‘ tendencies to allow amicus briefs to influence their decision-making);
John Harrington, Note, Amici Curiae in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are
They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 667, 677 (2005) (―The arguments against broad amicus
participation raise concerns about workload problems, increased litigation costs, improper
use of the device by parties, and the improper use of courts of appeals to further interest
group politics.‖).
22. See, e.g., Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, ABA, http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf
(last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (reporting that fourteen states have elected high court justices,
while another seventeen have uncontested retention elections).
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state courts through amicus briefs has the potential to politicize
state court proceedings in a way that is different than in federal
courts with lifetime appointments.
If amicus curiae participation grows in lower federal and state
courts, these tribunals should clarify the role of amicus and consider reasonable limitations. An open door policy can go too far.
As one court stated in a different context, ―What makes for health
23
as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as a daily diet.‖
The voices of the litigants, as well as basic adversarial principles,
can get lost as more and more friends muscle their way into court,
eager for influence or the limelight. Courts, especially state and
lower federal courts, should exert some restrictions on amicus curiae participation.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the history
of amicus curiae in the American courts. Part II describes the different types of amici curiae, from governmental amici to the
Court‘s Lawyer, Friends of a Party, Independent Friends, and
Near Intervenors. Part III examines the minimal constraints on
amicus curiae and the amicus brief itself—its content, page limit,
and due date—as well as judicial attitudes towards amicus curiae, as revealed in the court rules and occasional written opinions
and surveys. Part IV considers whether and how to limit current
amicus curiae participation. The article concludes that although
amicus briefs do not seem to be a problem for most courts, there
are some reforms to consider. To better assess amicus credibility,
all courts should consider requiring financial and authorship disclosure, as the Supreme Court of the United States does. Should
lower courts become overwhelmed with interest group briefs, they
might also consider restrictions on duplicative briefs, or briefs
that offer nothing useful for the court. A clearer sense of the different types of amicus curiae, and their different contributions or
potential for abuse, will help courts address problems that may
arise. This may also help some of those who complain that amici
curiae are not true to the original concept of ―friend of the court.‖
In reality, we are long past that definition.

23. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing jury
nullification).

2015]

FRENEMIES OF THE COURT

367

I. THE HISTORY OF AMICUS CURIAE
Several articles recount the rise of amicus curiae participation
in the Supreme Court of the United States.24 Most begin with a
1963 article by Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From
25
Friendship to Advocacy. Krislov‘s article, the thesis of which is
clear from the title, describes the early, common law role of amicus curiae as that of the disinterested bystander who offered the
26
court important information or suggestions. ―Bystander‖ here is
meant literally: a lawyer—though it need not have been a lawyer—on another case who might have been in the court and then
offered information or advice. The information might have been
about a legal point, an error on the court‘s part, the death of a
party, or the existence of other proceedings. Krislov tells of ―one
extreme instance,‖ when ―Sir George Treby, a member of Parliament, informed the court that he had been present at the passage
of the statute whose meaning was contested and, as amicus curiae, wished to inform the court of the intent of Parliament in passing the legislation.‖27 At common law, the definition of amicus curiae was flexible and rested within the court‘s discretion.28
But even as amicus curiae were described as disinterested, the
amicus role allowed courts to address the shortcomings of the adversarial system by giving voice to other persons potentially affected by the suit.29 An important function of the amicus curiae
30
was to inform the court about collusive suits. Third parties who
might not have standing, but whose interests were affected, could
be heard. Thus, already in early times amicus curiae might not
have been so much the court‘s friend, as the friend of a particular
interest or person.
It is worth pausing at this point to consider whether the term
―amicus‖ or ―friend‖ may itself have undergone a change over the
centuries. The principal modern definition of friend is ―a person
24. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme
Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782, 782–84 (1990); Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 15, at 749; Larsen, supra note 19, at 2.
25. Krislov, supra note 4.
26. See id. at 695.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 703–04.
30. Id. at 696.
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whom one knows, likes, and trusts.‖31 In Samuel Johnson‘s 1755
dictionary, the first entry for ―friend‖ is similar to today‘s meaning: ―One joined to another in mutual benevolence and intimacy:
32
opposed to foe or enemy.‖ But Johnson mentioned other uses of
the term: ―One without hostile intentions‖ and ―A familiar compellation: Friend, how camest thou in hither?‖33 These more expansive meanings survive in the formal terms of address in British (and Canadian) courts and government, such as ―my learned
34
friend.‖ Thus, an amicus curiae probably did not mean one
joined in intimacy and mutual benevolence with the court, but
more likely meant something closer to ―not hostile‖ or ―respectable colleague.‖ Yet, the warm connotations of friendship linger
with the term.
In the early days of the United States, amicus curiae began to
take on another role: that of representing the public—or governmental—interest in private disputes.35 Krislov believed that ―[t]he
creation of a complex federal system meant not only that state
and national interests were potentially in conflict, but also that
an even greater number of conflicting public interests were potentially unrepresented in the course of private suits.‖36 The Supreme Court broadened the role of amicus curiae, so that the
state and federal governments could be heard on matters that
implicated their interests.37 The first appearance of an amicus curiae for a state interest was that of Henry Clay on behalf of the
31. Friend, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed.
2011), available at http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hmdictenglang/friend/
0?searchId=add1f8be-4e40-11e4-8e03-0aea1e24c1ac&result=0 (using the search term
―friend‖). Other definitions include: ―2. A person whom one knows; an acquaintance. 3. A
person with whom one is allied in a struggle or cause; a comrade. 4. One who supports,
sympathizes with, or patronizes a group, cause or movement: friends of the clean air
movement.‖ Id. (emphasis added). The term is being somewhat watered down by the newer
meaning of, ―any contact one has on a social networking site.‖ See id.
32. Friend (noun), A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF
THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON, http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=70
70&i=861 (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
33. Id.
34. Friend Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed.
2010), https://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/friend (―[M]y honourable
friend Brit. Used to address or refer to another member of one‘s own party in the House of
Commons. [M]y learned friend Brit. Used by a barrister or solicitor in court to address
or refer to another barrister or solicitor. [M]y noble friend Brit. Used to address or refer
to another member of one‘s own party in the House of Lords.‖).
35. Krislov, supra note 4, at 697.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 699–702.
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State of Kentucky in an 1821 case involving land holdings.38 It
quickly became an accepted practice for the federal and state governments to appear as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court.39
The appearance of private litigant amici curiae evolved more
40
slowly. These private litigants might be parties with similar
cases likely to be affected by the ruling, or persons who just barely lacked intervenor status.41 Initially, it was not the represented
party but the lawyer himself who was considered the ―friend‖ of
42
the court. But by the 1930s, it was quite common for the person
or organization being represented to be denominated the amicus
43
curiae. Over time, minority, labor, business, and advocacy
groups began to participate in greater number as amici curiae in
court.44 By the 1940s, some members of the Supreme Court were
irritated at the rate of participation.45 Subsequently, the Court
began to exercise its gatekeeping powers and the rate declined.46
However, by the 1950s the policy changed, and amicus curiae
participation began to increase again.47 In fact, amicus curiae
played a critical role in the civil rights litigation of the 1950s and
1960s.48
In recent decades, amicus curiae participation in the Supreme
Court has escalated, even as the Court has tightened the standing requirements for litigants.49 An empirical analysis showed
that:
From 1986 through 1995, amici filed briefs in 85% of the Court‘s argued cases. Between 1945 and 1995, the number of amicus brief fil38. Id. at 700 (referencing Green v. Biddle, 22 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823)).
39. Id. at 701–02.
40. See id. at 702–03.
41. See id. at 703.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 710.
45. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 784.
46. Krislov, supra note 4, at 713–14.
47. Id. at 714–16.
48. See id. at 718–20.
49. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 784–85, 788; F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 289 (2008) (―In its original form, standing enforced the rule that the judiciary had the power only to vindicate private rights in suits by private litigants. During the mid-twentieth century, however, the
Court expanded standing by abandoning the private rights requirement and conditioning
standing on a showing of factual injury. Then, during the last twenty-five years, the Court
has again restricted standing.‖).
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ings increased by more than 800%, while the numbers of cases decided on the merits did not increase. Between 1996 and 2003, at
50
least one amicus brief was filed in 95% of cases.

One ―prominent law firm partner‖ was quoted even thirty years
ago as saying that ―[i]n today‘s world, effective representation of
your client requires that you at least seriously explore the possibility of enlisting persuasive amicus support on your client‘s be51
half.‖ In 2013, the highly publicized Supreme Court case of
United States v. Windsor52 attracted 134 appellate court briefs,
53
according to Westlaw. During the same term, Shelby County v.
Holder attracted 63 total appellate court briefs, almost all of
54
which were amicus briefs, and the Affordable Care Act case,
55
NFIB v. Sebelius, attracted over 140 amicus briefs.
Because the Court no longer screens amicus curiae in any
meaningful way, it no longer creates law on the criteria for amicus curiae. Perhaps for that reason, a 1903 Supreme Court decision, Northern Securities. Co. v. United States, is still cited.56 In
that case, the Court denied an application to appear as amicus
curiae and stated:
Where in a pending case application to file briefs is made by counsel
not employed therein, but interested in some other pending case involving similar questions, and consent is given, the court has always
exercised great liberality in permitting this to be done. And doubtless it is within our discretion to allow it in any case when justified
by the circumstances. It does not appear that applicant is interested
in any other case which will be affected by the decision of this case;
50. Simmons, supra note 2, at 193.
51. Andrew P. Moriss, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme Court’s 1997–1998 Term
Employment Law Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823, 825 (1999) (quoting
Bruce J. Ennis, Effective Amicus Briefs, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 603, 604 (1984)).
52. 570 U.S. ___, ___ , 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that DOMA is invalid because it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment).
53. Appellate Court Filings, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (search ―133 S. Ct. 2675‖; then click on ―Filings‖; then narrow by ―Appellate Court Documents‖; and finally by ―Briefs‖).
54. Appellate Court Filings, Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013), WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (search ―133 S. Ct. 2612‖; then click on ―Filings‖; then narrow by ―Appellate Court Documents‖; and finally by ―Briefs‖).
55. Appellate Court Filings, NFIB v. Sebelius, 570 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012),
WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com/ (search ―132 S. Ct. 2566‖; then click on ―Filings‖;
then narrow by ―Appellate Court Documents‖; and finally by ―Briefs‖).
56. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555, 555–56 (1903); see, e.g., Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing N. Sec. Co.,
191 U.S. at 556 (1903)); see also United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165 (6th Cir.
1991) (citing N. Sec. Co., 191 U.S. 555 (1903)).
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as the parties are represented by competent counsel, the need of as57
sistance cannot be assumed; and consent has not been given.

The Northern Securities decision expresses a much more limited view of the justification for amicus curiae than the Court now
assumes. The case emphasizes the use of amicus curiae to make
up for shortcomings in the representation of the parties or where
58
amicus has an interest in a pending case with similar questions.
It says nothing about special perspective or information, the more
59
common justifications for Friend of a Party briefs today.
Yet while the role of amicus curiae—and the rate of amicus
participation—has expanded in the Supreme Court of the United
States, the federal courts of appeals have not experienced the
60
same rate of increase. Although some federal judges complain
about too many useless amicus briefs,61 one study of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit showed that
amicus filings actually decreased between 2003 and 2007 and
that the total number of such filings was not substantial.62 Another study also suggests that amicus filings in all circuit level
courts are low.63 Because these are high volume intermediate level courts, it makes sense that professional amicus curiae advocacy
groups are less attuned to their dockets and less likely to know
about upcoming cases unless approached by a party.
The state experience has also been different from that of the
Supreme Court. Even in the early part of the twentieth century,
state courts were more likely to want amici curiae to be ―neutral‖
rather than aligned with one of the parties.64 In 1921, the Su57. N. Sec. Co., 191 U.S. at 555–56 (internal citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. See Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1220.
60. See Simard, supra note 3, at 686; see also Sylvia H. Walbolt & Joseph H. Lang, Jr.,
Amicus Briefs: Friend or Foe in Florida Courts?, 32 STETSON L. REV. 269, 281–82 (2003)
(highlighting, in particular, the rise of amicus participation in the Supreme Court of the
United States).
61. Paul M. Collins Jr., & Wendy L. Martinek, Who Participates as Amici Curiae in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals? 94 JUDICATURE 128, 130 (2010).
62. See P. Stephen Gidiere III, The Facts and Fictions of Amicus Curiae Practice in
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 11–12 (2008).
63. See Simard, supra note 3, at 686–87. Though still low, there were slightly higher
percentages of cases with amicus (15% or more) in the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit.
See id. at 686–87 & n.75.
64. Sarah F. Corbally, Donald C. Bross & Victor E. Flango, Filing of Amicus Curiae
Briefs in State Courts of Last Resort: 1960–2000, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 39, 43 (2004) (citing People v. Gibbs, 38 N.W. 257 (Mich. 1888)). Although the Gibbs court found no error in the
attorney—formerly working with the prosecution—suggesting that the defendant be re-
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preme Court of Michigan distinguished between amicus curiae
and intervenors, stating that the former were welcome in cases of
public import.65 However, the court denied either status to a citizen who sought to participate in a suit between a city and a power company, because he was too interested to be an amicus curiae
66
and not interested enough to be an intervenor.
In 1927, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in In re Stolen, rebuked sixty lawyers who filed an amicus brief in a judicial discipline case. Calling the brief a ―petition,‖ that court stated:
The brief itself did not pretend to examine or analyze the evidence,
and, so far as a discussion of the law was concerned, it did no more
than to cite a few cases upon the most fundamental propositions. If
this was done deliberately and with the purpose of influencing the
court, it was reprehensible. If done thoughtlessly and without any
consideration, the opinions of these members of the bar are entitled
to no weight . . . . If 60 members of the bar may thus petition the
court with reference to matters pending before it, then 60 plumbers
67
cannot be denied the same privilege.

The In re Stolen court seemed to object to a frank effort to lobby
the court without even a fig leaf of legal argument.68 But it is not
clear that the court would have welcomed the brief even with legal argument. Wisconsin‘s present day rules for amicus curiae
participation, however, are flexible.69
Although the rate of amicus curiae participation in state courts
is nowhere near that of the Supreme Court of the United States,
it has grown, albeit unevenly. A 2004 article showed great variation in the rate of amicus curiae participation in the states.70 It
found higher amicus curiae participation in Alabama, California,
Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, and Washington.71 But the authors noted that
quired to plead guilty or not guilty to the charges, its reasoning was that any member of
the bar could have made the suggestion. Gibbs, 38 N.W. at 258.
65. City of Grand Rapids v. Consumers‘ Power Co., 185 N.W. 852, 854 (Mich. 1921).
66. Id. at 853–54; Krislov, supra note 4, at 704 & n.57.
67. In re Stolen, 214 N.W. 379, 387 (Wis. 1927) (citation omitted).
68. See id.; see also Garcia, supra note 2, at 336–38 (vigorously defending amicus participation as expressive activity protected by the First Amendment‘s Petition Clause).
69. WIS. STAT. § 809.19(7)(a) (2012) (―A person not a party may by motion request
permission to file a brief. The motion shall identify the interest of the person and state
why a brief filed by that person is desirable.‖).
70. See Corbally, Bross & Flango, supra note 64, at 44–46.
71. See id. at 46.
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other studies had grouped the states slightly differently.72 The
2004 study also tentatively concluded that the states with the
most restrictive rules created the restrictions in response to high
73
amicus curiae participation and that courts granted 70% of mo74
tions to file amicus briefs. It was also rare for the courts to solicit amici curiae. Although the number of amicus briefs in state
75
high courts tripled in the 1980s, less than 5% of the high court
decisions in Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, South Dakota, and Texas involved amicus curiae briefs.76
A survey of amici curiae in California showed a very high rate
of participation. In the California Supreme Court, 1,868 amicus
briefs were filed in 422 of the 707 civil cases decided between
77
2000 and 2009.
My own research shows variation consistent with these studies.
In 2010, for example, the Washington Supreme Court issued 49
out of 141 reported opinions in which at least one amicus brief
was filed (35%), while the California Supreme Court issued 54 out
of 102 such opinions (53%). Arizona had 9 supreme court decisions in which amicus briefs were filed, out of a total of 41 reported opinions that year (22%).78
Scholarly interest in amicus curiae has been intermittent over
the last twenty-five years. Some scholars have attempted to empirically measure the effect of amicus briefs on case outcomes—a
difficult task.79 Scholars have also looked at interest group partic72. See id. at 45 (citing Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the
Comparative Study of the Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYS. J.
243, 253 (2001) (finding high amicus curiae participation in California, Michigan, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, and Oregon)).
73. Corbally, Brass & Flango, supra note 64, at 50. The authors rejected their hypothesis that more restrictive rules would mean fewer amicus briefs filed, concluding instead
that restrictive rules were a reaction to larger numbers of amicus curiae filings. Id. at 53.
74. Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 44.
76. Brace & Butler, supra note 72, at 252–53.
77. M.C. Sungaila, Effective Advocacy Through Amicus Briefs, S.F. DAILY J., June 28,
2010, at 6.
78. These figures come from a Westlaw Next search of California, Washington, and
Arizona Supreme Court opinions. To get these figures for each state, I first went to ―state
materials,‖ then clicked on the individual state, and then clicked on ―supreme court‖ to
restrict the search to the highest court. I then searched the supreme court opinions as follows: ―adv: DA(=2010) & DI,SY(court)‖ for the total number of supreme court opinions,
then searched within results for ―at(amic!)‖ for the number of cases with at least one amicus brief.
79. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 5, at 810–16; Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley &
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ipation through a political science lens.80 While some have examined the types of arguments and information provided by amici
curiae, they have not addressed the very different roles subsumed
within the categories of amicus curiae, nor have they addressed
the tension between the ideal of the impartial friend and the reality of the interested lobbyist.
II. THE TYPES OF AMICUS CURIAE
Some scholars have examined the type of information or argu81
ments presented by amicus curiae, but there has been no overall
examination of the different types of amicus curiae and their different roles. Neither courts nor scholars have focused on the difference between the Court‘s Lawyer (an attorney asked to make a
particular argument), the Invited Friend (one invited by the court
to appear as amicus curiae), the Friend of a Party, the Independent Friend (amicus curiae not aligned with a party), and the Near
Intervenor. Understanding the different roles is important as
they call for different criteria and policy considerations.
The types of organizations and individuals who will participate
as amici curiae also vary, ranging from activist or public advocacy
groups, nonprofits, corporations, business alliances, and political
organizations, to individuals (including law professors) concerned
about the issue or the outcome of the case.82 One particular type
of organization receives special treatment and is in a category by
itself: the government.
A. Governmental Amici
The executive branch enjoys special status in both federal and
state courts. Most courts allow the federal or state attorney general or solicitor general to file amicus briefs without advance
Jesse Hamner, Me Too? An Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97 JUDICATURE 228, 230 (2014); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 751–56.
80. See LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT, at xi–xii (1985); Caldeira & Wright,
supra note 24, at 783; Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in
the Courts: Amicus Participation in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339, 339–40
(1993).
81. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 2, at 203–09 (examining the functions of amicus
curiae briefs); Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1220–21 (discussing the basic functions of amicus
curiae briefs).
82. See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 790–91 (listing different classifications of
amici curiae).
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permission, even where leave of the court is otherwise required
for amicus curiae.83 It is understood that many private disputes
can have public importance and may affect the government or the
enforcement of the laws.
While the attorney general or solicitor general is the usual
court representative of a government‘s position, occasionally the
corresponding chief executive might file an amicus brief on its
own behalf. For example, in the recent litigation over the Afford84
able Care Act, Governor Christine Gregoire of Washington
joined several attorneys general of other states in an amicus brief
85
in support of the legislation, while Washington‘s attorney general joined in a brief against the law.86 State legislators and mem87
bers of Congress also filed amicus briefs in the litigation, although in doing so, they did not represent the government as a
whole.88
83. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(a) (―The United States or its officer or agency or a
state may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or leave of court.
Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief states that all
parties have consented to its filing.‖); accord ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16(a) (―[L]eave or written
consent shall not be required when the brief is presented by the State of Arizona or an officer or agency thereof, or by a county, city, or town.‖); CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f)(8) (―The Attorney General may file an amicus curiae brief without the Chief Justice‘s permission unless
the brief is submitted on behalf of another state officer or agency.‖).
84. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012); Florida
v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2011).
85. See Brief of the States of Oregon, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 1, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(No. 11-400). Governor Gregoire also filed her own brief at the court of appeals level. See
Amicus Brief of the Governor of Washington Christine Gregoire in Support of Defendants/Appellants, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067).
86. Reply Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant States, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health &
Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067).
87. E.g., Brief of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents at 1–2, Florida v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 567 U.S. ___, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).
88. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2003).
Judge Posner has opined that legislators cannot represent the government in an amicus
brief.
There is something to be said for asking the state to speak in litigation with
one voice. Insofar as the district court in the decision that has been appealed
placed limitations on what a state legislature may do, not only in this case
but presumably in any like case that should arise in the future, it might seem
that the leaders of the legislature have a direct interest in other cases, one of
the situations in which amicus participation is appropriate. But that argument would imply that any state legislator should have a right to file an amicus curiae brief when the constitutionality of state legislation is challenged—
an extreme position that could invite a blizzard of briefs.
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Government agencies can also participate as amici curiae. For
example, one scholar has examined the Department of Labor‘s efforts to influence the interpretation of wage and hour legislation
89
through amicus curiae activity. The relatively new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has a visible amicus curiae presence.90
Although government officials—particularly the solicitors general or attorneys general—have a special amicus curiae status
and role in many cases, they may also participate in most of the
roles described below, although most likely not as the Court‘s
Lawyer.
B. The Court’s Lawyer
The Court‘s Lawyer is the court‘s hand-picked advocate who is
asked to represent a particular position.91 The Supreme Court of
the United States makes use of these appointed amici curiae to
argue positions abandoned (or never advocated) by a party or to
defend lower court reasoning neither party endorses.92 This latter
type of amicus curiae is perhaps the most ―friendly‖ to the court.
But this friend is more of an advocate retained for the court—
highly partisan rather than disinterested.
Id.
89. See Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1226–28 (arguing that aggressive amicus activity
and exploration of Chevron deference allows the department to avoid the rule-making process); see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct.
2156, 2166–67 (2012) (holding Chevron deference would not apply to amicus position
where such deference would create ―unfair surprise‖ or where the agency‘s position ―does
not reflect the agency‘s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question‖) (quoting
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
90. Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.
gov/amicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
91. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 916 (demonstrating the Supreme Court‘s willingness to propose ―a friend of the court [] be appointed‖ to argue if counsel for respondent is
unwilling).
92. See id. at 918. An example of this kind of amicus curiae is Professor Paul Cassel,
invited to make the argument to overrule Miranda v. Arizona in Dickerson v. United
States. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 441 & n.7 (2000); see also Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae Supporting Complete Severability at 1–2, NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Nos. 11-393 and 11-400) [hereinafter Brief for Court-Appointed
Amicus Curiae] (―This brief is submitted in response to the Court‘s order of November 18,
2011, appointing counsel to brief and argue in support of the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that the minimum care provision of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, is severable from the entirety of the remainder of the Act.‖).
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With this type, the term amicus curiae refers to the lawyer appointed to represent a position, not to a group or person represented by the lawyer. For all other types of amici curiae, the term
usually refers to the client, often an interest group, rather than
93
the lawyer who files the brief. The Court‘s Lawyer seems close to
one historical understanding of the term, reflected in the criteria
for amicus applications in many jurisdictions. Some court rules
suggest that an amicus curiae may be appropriate where one par94
ty is without counsel or poorly represented. Thus, in the past,
where the court believed one party needed additional representation, or that a particular argument needed development, it might
95
have asked a lawyer to act as amicus curiae. However, today‘s
Court‘s Lawyers may be appointed regardless of the adequacy of
96
party representation in proceedings below.
The Court‘s Lawyer type of amicus curiae seems problematic in
that the court appears to be stepping out of its neutral arbiter
role and promoting advocacy of particular positions, even where
both parties are well-represented. On the other hand, these appointments can be seen as an effort by the court to fully air arguments it is considering but which the parties are not making.
Once again, the Affordable Care Act litigation provides examples
of this type of amicus curiae.97 Interestingly, in that case, additional amicus briefs were filed in support of the court-appointed
amici curiae; even the amici have amici!98

93. See Mark Walsh, Frequent Fliers: It Was Another Big Term for Amicus Curiae
Briefs at the High Court, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2013, at 16 (describing an increasing number of
amicus briefs due to interest groups viewing them as strategy). Of course, sometimes the
client and lawyer are one and the same. Individual lawyers now also file briefs on their
own behalf as Friends of a Party. See id. at 17, 67 (noting the impact of a brief filed by
former Solicitor General Walter Dellinger on his own behalf).
94. See infra notes 213–16 and accompanying text.
95. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555, 555–56 (1903) (suggesting that
amicus could be appointed where one party was not competently represented).
96. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 916, 920, 92425, 93132 (noting that the Court
may appoint ―friends of the court‖ where the Respondent has since changed its position,
where neither party accepts the lower court‘s sua sponte decision, or where the Court raises its own question sua sponte).
97. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae, supra note 92, at 1–2; Brief for CourtAppointed Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur (Anti-Injunction Act) at 1, U.S. Dep‘t of
Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
98. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG, http:
//www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-independent-business-v-sebel
ius/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (listing ―Amicus Briefs in Support of the Court-Appointed
Amicus‖).
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C. The Invited Friend99
The Invited Friend is the individual, group, or institutional actor asked to provide its perspective. For example, the court might
ask a government agency, another branch of the court system, or
the attorney general to weigh in on issues of public import or is100
sues that may affect that institution. Unlike the Court‘s Lawyer, the Invited Friend is not assigned a particular position or ar101
gument but rather assists on a more generalized level. This
type of amicus curiae is the prototype of the impartial friend,
providing helpful advice or information.
D. Friend of a Party
The Friend of a Party amicus curiae usually coordinates with a
party and may be solicited by a party.102 Some of these friends are
actually ―puppets‖ of the party:103 the party may have created or
funded the amicus curiae organization, or the party‘s lawyer may
have actually authored the brief.104 Not all states even require
disclosure of such a connection and few forbid it outright.105
99. In Canada and other Commonwealth countries, only those invited by the Court to
submit briefs are properly called amicus curiae. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Others who seek to file briefs in cases in which they are not a party are called ―interveners.‖ See supra note 7.
100. See, e.g., Entente Design, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 219 n.2 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2013) (―Although we recognize the superior court ordinarily lacks standing to oppose a petition such as this, we invited a response from the superior court because of the
potential impact of our decision on the superior court‘s civil case management procedures.‖) (internal citations omitted) (holding that assignment of action to new judge was
not within the master calendar rule‘s limitation on peremptory challenges to judges).
101. See David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme
Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of
the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 242 (2009) (referencing the Supreme
Court‘s use of the solicitor general as an invited friend to assist in analyzing the position);
Neal Nettesheim & Clare Ryan, Friend of the Court Briefs: What the Curiae Wants in an
Amicus, 80 WIS. LAW. 10, 12 (2007) (noting how the court may solicit amicus participation
where the parties have inadequately briefed an important issue).
102. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat‘l
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2000).
103. See Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d at 544; Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 617.
104. See Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 2003); Scheidler, 223 F.3d at
617.
105. Glassroth, 347 F.3d at 919 (―It comes as no surprise to us that attorneys for parties solicit amicus briefs in support of their position, nor are we shocked that counsel for a
party would have a hand in writing an amicus brief. In fact, we suspect that amicus briefs
are often used as a means of evading the page limitations on a party‘s briefs.‖) (internal
citations omitted). The puppet amicus curiae can also risk making arguments that the
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But even where there is no direct financial connection, party
kinship may be clear, such as industry groups appearing on behalf of an industry party, unions supporting the position of an
employee, or advocacy groups arguing for a position that benefits
a minority group of which a party is a member. Although the
Friend of a Party amicus curiae is very common today, especially
in the Supreme Court, some courts remain suspicious of amici cu106
riae with close connections to a party.
It is the Friend of a Party category of amicus curiae whose participation has grown the most over the last century, especially in
107
recent decades. This is the prototypical amicus curiae that now
springs to mind when we hear the term. We think of an interest
or advocacy group, induced to participate because the issue is important to its membership. Friend of a Party amici curiae may also hope that amicus participation will serve their efforts to gain
visibility. Amicus briefs become another means of lobbying on behalf of the membership.108
Friend of a Party briefs can also be a part of a coordinated law
reform effort. For example, the United States Chamber of Commerce has enjoyed success with its efforts in the Supreme Court
party dare not. See Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme
Court Amicus Brief, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523, 532 (2003).
106. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir.
1997); Liberty Lincoln Mercury Inc., v. Ford Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 82 (D.N.J.
1993) (―When the party seeking to appear as amicus curiae is perceived to be an interested
party or to be an advocate of one of the parties to the litigation, leave to appear amicus
curiae should be denied . . . [But] [w]here a petitioner‘s attitude toward a litigation is patently partisan, he should not be allowed to appear as amicus curiae.‖) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the Court or
Nuisances?, 33 LITIG. 5, 5 (2006) (referencing the recent ―movement of marked antipathy
to amicus briefs‖ generally, including Judge Posner‘s hostility).
107. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
108. Advocacy group websites often tout amicus brief filings. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae
Briefs, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/amicus.html (last visited
Nov. 24, 2014) (listing some recent amicus briefs filed by the ABA in various cases); The
Internet Association Files Amicus Brief to Quash the NYAG Subpoena Against Airbnb,
INTERNET ASS‘N (Nov. 18, 2013), http://internetassociation.org/11082013airbnbamicus
brief/ (publishing news of the Internet Association‘s filing of an amicus brief in a press release); Amicus Briefs, NAT‘L ASS‘N OF CRIM. DEF. L., http://www.nacdl.org/Amicus/ (last
visited Nov. 24, 2014) (providing links to the NACDL‘s Amicus Curiae Committee Mission
Statement and former amicus briefs catalogued by year); EPIC Amicus Curiae Briefs,
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/amicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014) (―EPIC frequently files amicus curiae, or ‗friend of the court‘, briefs in federal and state appellate
cases concerning emerging privacy and civil liberties issues.‖). Even government agencies
boast of their amicus activity. Accord Amicus Program, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
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and is now increasingly filing amicus briefs in state courts.109 The
International Association of Defense Counsel also boasts of its
amicus curiae record in federal and state court.110
E. Independent Friend
The Independent Friend amicus curiae is an organization or
111
individual who does not support either party. They may participate for the same reasons that groups decide to weigh in as
Friends of a Party: because the issue is important to them and/or
their membership. Although most amici curiae will pick sides in
112
the dispute, it is not necessary that they do so. The Independent
Friend seems to be relatively rare, however. After the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the case of Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby,
for example, only two amicus briefs were filed on behalf of neither
party out of eighty-four total.113
F. Near Intervenors
Near Intervenors are people or groups likely to be affected by a
case but whose interest is not sufficient for intervention.114 Not all
courts allow amicus curiae with this type of interest, on the
109. Holly Yeager, U.S. Chamber, Other Business Groups Set Sights on State Courts,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2013, at A5.
110. See Mary-Christine Sungaila, The IADC Amicus Brief Program: Its Increasing
Success and Influence, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 32, 34 (2014).
111. See Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and National Law,
INT‘L L. 415, 428 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2005).
112. Yet too much independence can also thwart amicus curiae status. For example, an
amicus curiae application by an organization that supported neither party‘s position—
where the parties were not opposed—was held properly excluded. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d
654, 656, 674 (Conn. 2005) (ruling that where the defendant did not contest the death
penalty, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the public defender organization amicus
curiae, intervenor, or next friend status). In another example, attorneys for a district court
judge sought to appear as amicus curiae in a case which had been reassigned to another
judge, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that neither the judge nor her attorneys had sufficient interest to appear as amicus curiae. Ligon v. City of New York, 736
F.3d 166, 169–71 (2d Cir. 2013).
113. Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 732 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted,
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). See the list of amici curiae in the case including the two filed on behalf of neither party at Amicus History: Hobby Lobby Supreme Court Amicus Briefs Among
Record Levels, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hobby
lobbyamicus/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
114. Rios v. Enterprise Ass‘n Steamfitters Local Union No. 638, 520 F.2d 352, 357 (2d
Cir. 1975) (denying applicants intervention because of a lack of sufficient interest in the
case).
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grounds that an amicus curiae should be an impartial advisor to
the judiciary.115 But many courts will use this amicus curiae category as a remedy for those who cannot make a showing for intervention. For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted
that a crime victim, even if lacking standing in the defendant‘s
116
appeal, could participate as an amicus curiae. In another example, an Indian tribe was denied permission to intervene in a dispute between two casino developers, but was allowed to file an
amicus brief ―because of its involvement in the events leading to
this case and its interest in the Transactions Agreements at is117
sue.‖ Additionally, a local irrigation district was permitted to
file an amicus brief in a Clean Water Act case against dairy oper118
119
ations. There are other examples. This Near Intervenor type
of amicus curiae will be anything but impartial. Such amici are
advocates of their own private interests.120 Some court rules
acknowledge this possibility and ask amici curiae to disclose
whether their interest in the case is private or public.121

115. Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418, 420 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (―Indeed, if the proffer comes
from an individual with a partisan, rather than impartial view, the motion for leave to file
an amicus brief is to be denied, in keeping with the principle that an amicus must be a
friend of the court and not a friend of a party to the cause.‖). But see Neonatology Assocs.
v. Comm‘r, 293 F.3d 128, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing generally the difficult conflict
between impartiality and interest, but noting that an amicus curiae is implicitly required
to have an interest in the case).
116. State v. Tedesco, 69 A.3d 103, 109 (N.J. 2013) (―The victim‘s arguments should be
heard and evaluated, if not as a party with standing, then as an amicus under Rule 1:139.‖).
117. NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1063,
1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
118. Cmty. Ass‘n for Restoration of the Env‘t (CARE) v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 54 F.
Supp. 2d 974, 975–76 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
119. In a dispute between the United States government and a firm constructing caissons on coral reefs, a federal district court denied the right to intervene to one who
claimed to own the reef, but allowed the would-be intervenor to proceed as an amicus curiae. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 820–22, 829 (5th Cir. 1967) (reversing the district court decision and allowing the party to intervene); see also Silver v. Babbitt, 166 F.R.D. 418, 434–35 (D. Ariz. 1994) aff’d, 68 F.3d 480, 481 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying
motion to intervene but granting amicus curiae status).
120. See, e.g., NGV Gaming, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (―[A]micus with partisan interests
are now quite common.‖).
121. See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.01 (requiring that an amicus request must
―identify whether the applicant‘s interest is public or private in nature‖); N.J. GEN. R.
1:13-9(a) (requiring that amicus must state ―the nature of the public interest therein and
the nature of the applicant‘s special interest, involvement or expertise in respect thereof‖);
OR. R. APP. P. 8:15 (―The application shall state whether the applicant intends to present a
private interest of its own or to present a position as to the correct rule of law that does
not affect a private interest of its own.‖).
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The Near Intervenor should be distinguished from the amicus curiae who is interested in the outcome because it has a similar case
pending, one that could be controlled by precedent set in the instant case. The latter type of amicus will probably fall into the
Friend of a Party category (e.g., an employer involved in another
lawsuit that will be controlled by the precedent). If the precedent
is likely to be of wide applicability—as is usually true in the Supreme Court—then an interest group (e.g., an employer association) will probably weigh in. In contrast, the Near Intervenor has
an interest in the particular dispute at issue, not just its likely
precedential value.
The Near Intervenor may wish for more involvement in the
case than amicus curiae status allows. An experiment with ―liti122
gating amicus curiae‖ illustrates what can happen when the
categories are blended.
Decried as a ―legal mutant‖ by the Sixth Circuit,123 this type of
amicus curiae appears to have been a hybrid status used by trial
courts for a time in the 1980s and 1990s.124 The hybrid had an intervenor‘s ability to file pleadings and present evidence, but did
not need to satisfy the more demanding requirements of intervenor status.125 Instead, courts used the flexible definition of an
amicus curiae. Often, it was the U.S. Attorney who received this
status.126 After the Sixth Circuit‘s denunciation of the practice,
there have been few references to ―litigating amicus curiae‖ in the
127
case law. The term seems to have died away. Like most hybrids,
122. See generally Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus: When Does the Party
Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1992) (discussing the development of the ―litigating amicus curiae,‖ a type of amicus which possesses the capability to
participate in a case beyond mere brief writing).
123. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 164 (6th Cir. 1991).
124. See Wyatt v. Hanan, 868 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (―The court believes
that the concept of amicus curiae is flexible and that, as long as the amicus does not intrude on the rights of the parties, it can have a range of roles: from a passive one of providing information to a more active participatory one. In other words, although amici should
not assume control of the litigation, they can take an active role in some cases beyond
providing information.‖); DeVonish v. Garza, 510 F. Supp. 658, 658–59 (W.D. Tex. 1981)
(noting that the court appointed the federal government to participate as litigating amicus
curiae in litigation over conditions at the county jail).
125. See EEOC v. Boeing Co., 109 F.R.D. 6, 11 (W.D. Wash. 1985).
126. Krislov, supra note 4, at 705. Krislov recounts instances during the desegregation
era when the federal district courts of Arkansas and Mississippi designated the United
States Attorney as amicus curiae with authority to file pleadings, submit evidence, and
initiate further proceedings in order to maintain and preserve the due administration of
justice. Id. at 718–20.
127. See, e.g., NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d
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it has been unable to reproduce. The story of the ―litigating amicus curiae‖ shows the limits of the flexibility of the amicus curiae
role.
The Sixth Circuit‘s United States v. Michigan decision involved
a suit by the federal government against the State of Michigan
over prison conditions.128 The would-be intervenors were a group
of prisoners who eventually were represented by the American
129
Civil Liberties Union (―ACLU‖) and a prisoners‘ rights group.
When the trial court denied them permission to intervene as real
parties in interest, it allowed the prisoners to continue as amicus
curiae, and then allowed them as ―litigating amicus curiae‖ to file
130
pleadings. The reviewing court found that as amicus curiae, the
prisoners had hijacked the case:
There can be little doubt from the record of this appeal that the Knop
class, in its role of ―litigating amicus curiae‖ and exercising the authority of a named party/real party in interest, has virtually assumed effective control of the proceedings in derogation of the original parties to this controversy. The creation of this legal mutant
characterized as ―litigating amicus curiae,‖ as demonstrated by the
cascading acrimony among the participants to this litigation, if accorded precedential viability, will implicate and erode the future core
131
stability of American adversary jurisprudence as we know it today.
1061, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (―[A]n amicus curiae is not a party and has no control over the
litigation and no right to institute any proceedings in it . . . [p]articipation is restricted to
suggestions relative to matters apparent on the record . . . .‖) (citing Michigan, 940 F.2d at
163–64, and its disapproval of ―legal mutant‖ called the ―litigating amicus curiae‖);
Simard, supra note 3, at 694. A survey of federal judges published in 2008 found that most
of them opposed the idea of ―litigating amicus curiae.‖ Id. (―Not surprisingly, the respondents at all levels of the federal judiciary do not see tremendous utility in litigating amici.
Specifically, 90.9% of Circuit Court respondents and 89% of District Court respondents
indicated that litigating amici are a hindrance or a neutral consideration in litigation. Two
Supreme Court respondents indicated that litigating amici would be a hindrance.‖).
128. Michigan, 940 F.2d at 145–46.
129. Id. at 146.
130. Id. at 147.
131. Id. at 164. The court went on to say:
Neither the appellees nor the trial court have advanced, beyond conclusory
generalizations and conjecture, a persuasive argument that the trial court‘s
―litigating amicus curiae‖ order, whatever that term implies, does not seriously impinge the inherent rights of the only real parties in interest to this
CRIPA litigation between the United States and Michigan. The district
court‘s order has, by extrajudicial edict, impressed upon the United States
and Michigan a third-party legal interloper in the persona of the NPP–ACLU
and the ACLUFM acting through their structured willing surrogate, the
Knop class, all of whom had been denied real-party-in-interest status and
whose efforts to achieve that end had been earlier barred by the trial court.
The legal consequence of the district court‘s order was to achieve, by circum-
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*****
The amicus curiae types outlined above are not perfectly distinct. The discussion of governmental amici refers to a particular
type of actor, rather than its role in the litigation, and governmental amici may be a Friend of a Party, an Invited Friend, or an
Independent Friend. The Near Intervenor or Invited Friend may
also have an interest in the legal precedent set, and its interests
may align with a party so that it is also a Friend of a Party. Nevertheless, despite possible overlap, the categories are helpful in
developing a clearer analysis of the role of amici curiae.
III. THE BARE CONSTRAINTS
Amicus briefs must comply with the applicable court rules,132
but amicus curiae brief writers have great flexibility in choosing
what issues to address and how to address them. Due dates and
page limits vary with the jurisdiction, and these variations can
greatly affect how amici curiae participate. Criteria for amicus
curiae participation are fairly relaxed in most courts, and the
prevailing judicial attitude, with a few exceptions, is one of complacency.
A. The Amicus Curiae Brief
1. Content
Amici curiae, of whatever type, have great flexibility in the arguments and factual material they present to the court. Given
how strictly courts apply the rules of evidence, waiver, and standing to the parties, the freedom accorded amici curiae is striking.
Although the parties are limited in their factual arguments to
what is in the appellate court record and permitted by the rules of
evidence below, amici curiae routinely present ―legislative facts‖
133
in support of policy arguments. They can also present what
vention, a result that effectively and impermissibly abused all conventional
laws and judicial rules of civil practice and procedure for acquiring the status
and rights of a named party/real party in interest, including Fed. R. Civ. P.
14 and 17 through 25.
Id.
132.
133.

See infra Part III.A.2.
Id. at 675 & n.24. One of the first examples of this type of amicus curiae brief is
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amounts to testimony by individuals who were not involved in the
case.134 This type of ―new information‖ is frequently cited as the
benefit of amici curiae; it is precisely this information—not put
forward by the parties—that is said to be of assistance to the
135
court. The more general the information provided, the less controversial, especially in an era when courts can easily conduct
their own Internet research. Yet there is an argument that even
the presentation of new ―legislative facts‖ in amicus briefs undercuts the adversarial process and encourages appellate court ―ex136
tra-record factfinding.‖ Legislative facts introduced in this way
are not tested in the way that they might be were they introduced
137
and argued about in the trial court.
But even if amici curiae can freely present legislative facts,
should amici curiae be allowed to submit new facts about the particular dispute at issue?138 This is precisely the type of evidence
the Near Intervenor might want to present. For example, a nearby landowner may want to bring in new facts about a dispute between two other landowners, or a crime victim might want to tell
the court additional (or different) facts about the crime and its effect. We presume that judges, unlike juries, can distinguish between admissible and inadmissible information and that they will
disregard what is not permissible, even on appeal. But with certain information, it may be just as difficult to ―unring the bell‖ for
judges as for jurors.139 A party can move to strike an amicus brief
Louis Brandeis‘s brief in Muller v. Oregon. See infra note 151.
134. Larsen, supra note 19, at 25. An example is the brief filed by the National Abortion Rights Action League in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Lynn M. Paltrow, Amicus Brief: Richard Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 9 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 3, 4–5 (1986). The brief consisted
largely of personal accounts by women who had undergone abortions. Id. at 4. In another
example, in Gratz v. Bollinger, a brief filed on behalf of military commanders described the
history and importance of diversity in the military. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius
W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516).
135. Simard, supra note 3, at 682, 690. Even Judge Posner agrees that amicus curiae
briefs should be permitted ―when amicus has unique information or perspective that can
help the court . . . .‖ Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063
(7th Cir. 1997).
136. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 37; Larsen, supra note 19, at 42.
137. See Gorod, supra note 19, at 60–61.
138. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 60, at 291 (discussing the difference between ―legislative facts,‖ which amici curiae should be allowed to present, and ―nonrecord facts‖ about
the particular dispute at issue, which no party or amicus curiae should be allowed to introduce on appeal).
139. See Alan Hirsch, Confessions and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old
Approach, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 14 (2007) (arguing that confessions have an impact
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with improper factual material, but the damage may already be
done.
Some trial court judges, aware that amici curiae—particularly
amici curiae with their own private interests, i.e., Near Intervenors—may wish to introduce new evidence, preemptively direct
140
amici curiae not to introduce ―extra-record materials.‖ In appellate courts, factual review is already limited to what has been
141
made part of the record below —but the line between the record
and the wide world of Internet and book research is hard to draw.
It is clear that an amicus curiae is free to take risks with crossing
that line. Since an amicus will not be directly bound by the court‘s
142
judgment, it has less to lose if it irritates the court with new
facts.
Amici curiae have a similar freedom with their arguments and
thus may raise arguments that the parties would be foreclosed
from making.143 Again, these new arguments are often considered
a benefit to the court. The Supreme Court has considered new issues raised first by an amicus curiae,144 and even appoints amici
curiae—of the Court‘s Lawyer variety—to consider issues abandoned or never raised by the parties.145
Most other courts distinguish between entirely new issues—
which an amicus curiae may not present—and theories in support
of issues raised by the parties. As a Florida court said, in refusing
to consider new issues raised by amici curiae,
A significant distinction is apparent as between ―issues‖ and ―theories‖ in support of a particular issue. Amicus is not confined solely to
arguing the parties‘ theories in support of a particular issue. To so
confine amicus would be to place him in a position of parroting ―me

on appellate judges reviewing challenges to convictions).
140. Wilderness Soc‘y v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 09-CV-08010-PCT-PGR, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74709, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2010); see also NGV Gaming, Ltd. v. Upstream Point Molate, LLC, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
141. DANIEL J. MEADOR & JORDANA S. BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2, 55 (1994).
142. See Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1238.
143. Simard, supra note 3, at 674–75. Many state jurisdictions will not consider new
issues raised only by amicus curiae. The Supreme Court of the United States, however,
has decided cases based on the arguments of amicus on a number of occasions. See infra
Part III.B.1.
144. See infra Part III.B.1.
145. See supra Part II.B.
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too‖ which would result in his not being able to contribute anything
146
to the court by his participation in the cause.

As the Florida court further observed, if amici curiae hew too
close to the facts and arguments presented by the parties, they
risk having their submissions perceived as ―me too‖ briefs that
147
add nothing but their ―vote‖ to one side or the other. Although
such briefs are often derided as providing little assistance to the
court, some litigants frankly acknowledge their usefulness as an
148
―endorsement.‖ As one amicus brief author stated, ―Its purpose
is to tell the court that we agree with the appellant and we hope
149
it will decide in his favor.‖ While such signaling may have a
valuable democratic function in the federal courts, it is more
problematic in state courts with an elected bench. Should such
lobbying of the state courts be permitted?150
Finally, as nonparties with less at stake than the parties to the
dispute, amici curiae enjoy a certain freedom to innovate in briefwriting. It was amicus curiae that filed the first Brandeis brief,151
the first electronic brief in the Supreme Court152 and the first

146. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 60, at 291 (quoting Keating v. State, 157 So. 2d 567,
569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)).
147. Keating, 157 So. 2d at 569.
148. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 203.
149. Krislov, supra note 4, at 712 (quoting an exchange between Charles Abrams and
Newman Levy of the American Jewish Committee). Levy also said that if his brief repeated the arguments of the appellant, and the court relied on those arguments in its ruling,
―We would be able to say to our members, ‗Isn‘t that exactly what we told the court?‘‖ Id.
at 713.
150. In 1927, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin believed there was something reprehensible about a direct attempt to influence the court through an amicus brief by weighty signatories. In re Stolen, 214 N.W. 379, 387 (Wis. 1927). Of course, powerful interests can
always make their views known in another forum if the amicus curiae route is foreclosed.
They might write op-ed pieces in the paper, for example. In some ways, the amicus brief
simply allows those interest groups to make their views known in a more transparent way.
151. Louis Brandeis‘s brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), celebrated as an
innovation for its reliance on social science rather than legal argument, was more like an
amicus brief. Although Brandeis filed his brief on behalf of the State of Oregon, the state
attorney general also filed a traditional brief devoted to legal argument, with citation. David E. Bernstein, Brandeis Brief Myths, 15 GREEN BAG 2d 9, 12 (2011).
152. In 1995, a law professor attempted to file a hyperlinked amicus brief with the
Court, but it was rejected. Michael Whiteman, Appellate Court Briefs on the Web: Electronic Dynamos or Legal Quagmire?, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 467, 469 n.16 (2005). The Court accepted
a hyperlinked CD-ROM amicus brief the next year, however. See Brief of Amici Curiae
Am. Ass‘n of Univ. Professors, et al., in Support of Appellees, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 74396. See generally Elizabeth Porter, Taking Images Seriously, ___ COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing images in written legal argument).
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graphic (comic book) brief in federal court.153 As one scholar commented on the graphic brief, ―[A]mici may feel more freedom to
experiment with traditional legal forms given their quasi-outsider
154
status to litigation.‖ No attorney representing a party to the litigation would take the chance of filing a ―comic book‖ brief on the
merits.
2. Due Dates and Page Limits
Like the rules in most courts, Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States seems based on the assumption
that amicus briefs will be in support of a party and bases filing
deadlines on that assumption. The rule requires an amicus curiae
brief to be filed within seven days of the filing of the merits brief
by the party it supports ―or if in support of neither party, within 7
days after the time allowed for filing the petitioner‘s or appellant‘s brief.‖155 Amicus briefs in the Supreme Court are limited to
9000 words, while parties‘ briefs can be up to 15,000 words.156 The
federal courts of appeals have a similar seven-day deadline157 and
limit the amicus brief to one-half the length limit for a party‘s
brief on the merits.158
Similarly, in most states, the rules seem to anticipate close cooperation between amici curiae and a party, even in states where
amici curiae are exhorted to be true friends of the court. A significant number of states require the amicus brief to be filed at the
same time as the brief of the party that the amicus curiae supports.159 Another group requires the brief to be filed within seven
days of the party‘s brief.160 Others give the amicus curiae a longer
153. Brief of Bob Kohn as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.2d 638
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-2826), available at http://www.abajournal.com/files/AppleAmicus
Brief.pdf.
154. Porter, supra note 152, at 46.
155. SUP. CT. R. 37.3(a). The rule also specifies deadlines for an amicus curiae brief
filed in support of the granting of certiorari. SUP. CT. R. 37.2.
156. SUP. CT. R. 33.1(g).
157. FED. R. APP. P. 29(e).
158. FED. R. APP. P. 29(d).
159. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 345(b); IND. R. APP. P. 41(b); IOWA R. APP. P. 6.906(1);
LA. SUP. CT. R. 7(12); MASS. R. APP. P. 17; MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.05(f)(2); N.H. SUP. CT. R.
30(1); N.C. APP. R. 28(i); OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.12(d)(1); PA. R. APP. P. 531(a)(1); R.I. SUP.
CT. R. 16(h); VT. R. APP. P. 29(c); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:30(d); W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(d).
160. See, e.g., DEL. SUP. CT. R. 28(e); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.02; MISS. R. APP. P.
29(b); NEV. R. APP. P. 29(f); N.M. R. APP. 12-215(c); OR. R. APP. P. 8.15(4); UTAH R. APP. P.
25.
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time to file its brief. 161 If amici curiae and the parties want to be
sure that they do not duplicate each other, those with similar
deadlines will need to cooperate. Same time filing also allows the
parties to address the arguments of opposing amici curiae in their
own responding or reply briefs. Where amici curiae have later
deadlines, the parties may need to file additional responding
briefs, if allowed.
The page limits for amicus briefs also say something about the
states‘ view of amicus curiae participation. Like the federal
courts, several states limit amicus briefs to one-half the length al162
lowed for the party they support. A few others have fairly restrictive numerical limits of fifteen163 or twenty164 pages. But other
165
states allow amici curiae to file lengthy briefs. These page limits appear especially generous when one remembers that amicus
briefs need not include a statement of the case, nor address every
issue presented by the parties.
With the filing of the brief, amicus curiae participation is over.
Amici curiae do not have standing to file appellate motions, such
as a motion for reconsideration or a motion to strike.166 Amici curiae have no right to demand that their arguments be considered
by the court. Amicus curiae participation in oral argument is rare.167 And amici may not file a reply to a party‘s response to the
161. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f) (requiring filing within thirty days after all parties‘
briefs are filed); CONN. PRAC. BOOK § 67-7 (2014 ed.) (requiring filing within twenty days
of the filing of the brief of the party whom amicus supports); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 6.06(b)(1)
(requiring filing within thirty days before oral argument); ME. R. APP. P. 9(e)(1) (requiring
filing the same day as brief of appellee); NEB. CT. R. 2-109(A)(4) (requiring filing within
twenty days before oral argument); WASH. R. APP. P. 10.2(f) (requiring filing within fortyfive days before oral argument).
162. See, e.g., IOWA R. APP. P. 6.906(3); NEV. R. APP. P. 29(e).
163. See KY. R. CIV. P. 76.12; MISS. R. APP. P. 29(b).
164. See LA. SUP. CT. R. 7-12; WASH. R. APP. P. 10.4(b).
165. See ME. R. APP. P. 9(e)(1) (allowing fifty pages); WYO. R. APP. P. 7.12(d) (allowing
thirty-five pages). At one time, West Virginia had no page limit on amicus briefs, and a
judge noted that one amicus brief was ―certified by the Clerk of [] Court as weighing one
and three-eighths pounds.‖ Amy M. Smith, The History and Evolution of Amicus Curiae in
West Virginia, W. VA. LAW., Sept. 2013, at 42, 44 (quoting City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac Co., 308 S.E.2d 527, 539–40 (W. Va. 1983)). In the words of the judge, ―[s]ome
friend.‖ City of Fairmont, 308 S.E.2d at 540.
166. See SUP. CT. R. 37.3. (―The Clerk will not file a reply brief for an amicus curiae, or
a brief for an amicus curiae in support of, or in opposition to, a petition for rehearing.‖)
But see GA. SUP. CT. R. 23 (―Amici do not have standing to file motions for reconsideration,
but may submit briefs in support of a motion made by a party.‖).
167. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(g) (―An amicus curiae may participate in oral argument only with the court‘s permission.‖); ALASKA R. APP. P. 212(9) (―A motion of an amicus
curiae to participate in the oral argument will be granted only for extraordinary rea-
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amicus brief.168 Nevertheless, in filing a brief on the merits, amicus curiae at the appellate level are allowed to do almost as much
as the parties.
B. Judicial Attitudes Toward Amicus
Courts do not seem to distinguish between the various types of
amicus curiae. The fuzziness of the amicus curiae category is in
striking contrast to the complex and constraining rules of procedure that govern who can be a party and what issues may be
169
raised by whom. Most judges are probably welcoming—or at the
very least complacent—about amicus curiae participation. But
whether judges praise amicus curiae contributions or complain
about amicus brief abuse, they do not articulate rules that distinguish between, for example, Near Intervenors, Friends of a Party,
or Independent Friends. Instead, they discuss loose concepts such
as ―helpfulness to the court,‖ or they appeal to the concept of
friendliness.170 Nor do the court rules governing amicus curiae
participation make clear distinctions between the various types of
amici.
1. Supreme Court of the United States
The current rule governing amicus curiae in the Supreme
Court states:
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may
sons.‖); ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-6(b) (―Amici Curiae attorneys will not be permitted to participate in oral arguments.‖).
168. E.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29(f).
169. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1670 (2007) (―[T]he various Article III justiciability doctrines—standing, ripeness, mootness, political question, advisory opinions—all try to define the contours of the case-orcontroversy limitation.‖).
170. See, e.g., Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544–45 (7th Cir.
2003); Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997);
Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm‘r of Labor & Indus., 694 F.2d 203, 204 (9th Cir. 1982); Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm‘r., 293 F.3d 128, 132–33 (3rd Cir. 2002); Wildearth Guardians v.
Lane, No. CIV 12-118 LFG/KBM, 2012 WL 10028647, at *2 (D.N.M. June 20, 2012); N.
Mariana Islands v. United States, 2009 WL 596986, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2009); Triad
Int‘l Maint. Corp. v. S. Air Transp., Inc., 2005 WL 1917512, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10,
2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 2006 Ill. LEXIS 1, at *2 (Ill. Jan. 11, 2006); see also
Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, Justices Are Paying More Attention to Amicus
Briefs, NAT‘L L. JOURNAL (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/printerfri
endly/id=1202668846551 (discussing Justices‘ views on amicus briefs).
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be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does
not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not fa171
vored.

The rule‘s emphases on ―relevant matter‖ and ―help‖ suggest
that the Court is looking for factual and/or policy expertise. In
practice, however, the Court liberally permits amicus brief fil172
ings, many of which are more in the nature of petitions or votes
for one side or the other. But in an effort to perhaps better assess
the credibility of the amicus curiae effort, the rule also requires
disclosure of any connections to a party:
Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae listed in Rule
37.4 [federal, state or local governments], a brief filed under this
Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored the brief in
whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
the brief, and shall identify every person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribu173
tion.

This subsection, amended in 1997,174 has not slowed the growth
of amicus brief filings.
The Court will sometimes consider arguments raised for the
first time by amici curiae. In 1998, this practice prompted a D.C.
Circuit judge to express his disagreement with a Supreme Court
decision remanding the case to the circuit court on the basis of
arguments raised only by amicus curiae:
What is so remarkable about the Court‘s decision to vacate our decision and remand . . . is that the linchpin of the Court‘s decision is an
argument—pressed by an amicus curiae (ostensibly, as a jurisdictional objection)—upon which the FEC did not rely in declining to
171. SUP. CT. R. 37.1.
172. See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text.
173. SUP. CT. R. 37.6; see 1AA WEST‘S FED. FORMS § 438 cmt. 257–58 (1998). (―Rule
37.6 militates strongly against the covering up or masking of sources of views which are
being placed before the Court in amicus curiae briefs. In the past it has been in no way
unusual for parties to a case to stir up amicus support and to undertake to bear the monetary costs which the amicus would otherwise find it necessary to pay for having a brief
prepared and filed. Likewise, it has not been unusual for a party to say to the prospective
amicus that the party would be glad to have the party‘s lawyers prepare a draft of an amicus brief which the amicus can then file in its own name. Rule 37.6 does not outlaw such
practices. But it requires that the facts be disclosed, so that the Court will have information helpful in assessing the credibility to be attached to the views submitted by the
amicus.‖).
174. Id., amended by Act of May 1, 1997, ___ U.S.C.S. SUP. CT. R. 37.6; see Steven Finell, Appellate Rules and Statutes Focus: Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 28 APP. PRAC. J. 4, 5 (2009).
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bring enforcement proceedings . . . , and which therefore forms no
part of the agency decision that the district court, we, and the Supreme Court reviewed . . . . I recognize that the Supreme Court has
moved pretty far from traditional notions of judicial restraint that
confine courts to issues presented by the parties, but I think this de175
cision represents another large step in that regrettable process.

There are other instances of the Supreme Court deciding cases
based on issues raised by amici curiae.176 Yet other Supreme
Court cases hold that the Court will not consider arguments
raised only by amici curiae. As one recent opinion put it, ―Because
this argument was not raised by the parties or passed on by the
177
lower courts, we do not consider it.‖ In the Supreme Court,
therefore, precedent is mixed.
In the early 1950s, Justice Felix Frankfurter and Justice Hugo
Black differed on how restrictive the amicus curiae rules should
be, with Justice Black‘s view ultimately prevailing. 178 Decades
later, Justice Antonin Scalia commented in one case on the lopsided, and what he perceived as self-interested, participation of
amicus curiae. Dissenting from the Court‘s decision establishing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, he wrote:
In its consideration of this case, the Court was the beneficiary of no
fewer than 14 amicus briefs supporting respondents, most of which
came from such organizations as the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychoanalytic Association, the American Association of State Social Work Boards, the Employee Assistance Professionals Association, Inc., the American Counseling Association, and
the National Association of Social Workers. Not a single amicus curiae brief was filed in support of petitioner. That is no surprise.
There is no self-interested organization out there devoted to pursuit
179
of the truth in the federal courts.

175. Akins v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 146 F.3d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
176. In Mapp v. Ohio, the Court applied the exclusionary rule at the suggestion of amicus: ―Other issues have been raised on this appeal but, in the view we have taken of the
case, they need not be decided. Although appellant chose to urge what may have appeared
to be the surer ground for favorable disposition and did not insist that Wolf be overruled,
the amicus curiae, who was also permitted to participate in the oral argument, did urge
the Court to overrule Wolf.‖ 367 U.S. 643, 646 n.3 (1961); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 300 (1988) (addressing the question of retroactivity of habeas petitioner‘s claim despite the fact that the retroactivity issue was raised only in an amicus brief).
177. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1011 &
n.4 (2013) (citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60 n.2 (1981)).
178. Krislov, supra note 4, at 714–15; Caldeira & Wright, supra note 24, at 784–85.
179. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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As with many matters, and as these instances suggest, the
views of individual Justices on amicus curiae participation are
not likely uniform.
2. Federal Courts of Appeals
As in the Supreme Court, an amicus brief may be filed in a federal court of appeals with the consent of the parties or by permis180
sion of the court. The rule also requires the kind of disclosure
required in the Supreme Court.181 But the appellate court rule requires the would-be amicus curiae to show not only its interest
and why a brief is desirable, but also ―why the matters asserted
182
are relevant to the disposition of the case.‖ The comments to
this subsection state, ―Because the relevance of the matters asserted by an amicus is ordinarily the most compelling reason for
granting leave to file, the Committee believes that it is helpful to
180.

FED. R. APP. P. 29 provides in part:
(a) When Permitted. The United States or its officer or agency or a state
may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or leave of
court. Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the
brief states that all parties have consented to its filing.
(b) Motion for Leave to File. The motion must be accompanied by the proposed brief and state:
(1) the movant's interest; and
(2) the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters asserted
are relevant to the disposition of the case.
(c) Contents and Form. . . . An amicus brief . . . must include the following:
(1) if the amicus curiae is a corporation, a disclosure statement like that required of parties by Rule 26.1; . . .
(5) unless the amicus curiae is one listed in the first sentence of Rule 29(a), a
statement that indicates whether:
(A) a party's counsel authored the brief in whole or in part;
(B) a party or a party's counsel contributed money that was intended
to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and
(C) a person--other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel--contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so, identifies each such person.
181. Compare SUP. CT. R. 37.6 (requiring disclosure of ―whether counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part, and whether such counsel or a party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparations or submission of the brief‖ and disclosure
of the identity of ―every person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel,
who made such a monetary contribution‖), with FED. R. APP. P. 29(c)(5) (requiring an indication of ―whether: (A) a party‘s counsel authored the brief in whole or in part; (B) a party
or party‘s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting
the brief; and (C) a person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief and, if so,
identifies each such person . . . .‖).
182. FED. R. APP. P. 29(b)(2).
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explicitly require such a showing.‖183 Other than singling out the
government for favored status as an amicus curiae—as in all jurisdictions—the rule does not distinguish between the different
types of amicus curiae.
Aside from the rule and comments, the federal courts of appeals—with a few notable exceptions—have not said much about
184
the desirability or undesirability of amicus briefs. The lower
federal courts have not always adopted the Supreme Court‘s open
door policy, and occasionally a strong dissent is lodged.185 In one
case, Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit dissented from the denial of a motion by a group of law professors to file an amicus brief, and his
principle argument was that the courts should welcome assis186
tance that could help them avoid error. Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit once commented, in rejecting an argument against amicus
briefs,
These amici . . . take a legal position and present legal arguments in
support of it, a perfectly permissible role for an amicus. See MillerWohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 694 F.2d 203, 204
(9th Cir. 1982) (amici fulfill the classic role of amicus curiae by assisting in a case of general public interest, supplementing the assisting in a case of general public interest, supplementing the efforts of
counsel, and drawing the court‘s attention to law that might otherwise escape consideration). Moreover, we have stated that there is no
187
rule that amici must be totally disinterested.

The Ninth Circuit also stressed the difference between amici
curiae and parties in another case, denying an amicus curiae request for attorneys‘ fees.188 The court determined that amici curiae appointed by the court (Invited Friends, although the court did
not use that term) could be paid for their efforts by the court, but
otherwise amici curiae were ―volunteers, not appointees.‖189
183. Id. Advisory Committee‘s Notes.
184. Interestingly, federal judges themselves are not always allowed to appear as an
amicus curiae. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (denying the unopposed motion of retired federal jurists for leave to file amici in support of the petitioners
regarding the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
185. See id. at 935 (Rogers, J., dissenting); see also Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
186. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 645.
187. Funbus Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm‘n, 801 F.2d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986).
188. Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm‘r of Labor & Indus., 649 F.2d 203, 204–05 (9th Cir.
1982).
189. Id. at 205.
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Yet, because amicus briefs may be filed in federal court with
the agreement of the parties190 and therefore escape any published judicial commentary on their usefulness or desirability, it
191
is difficult to be certain of judicial attitudes overall.
A few federal judges have strong views about amicus briefs.
Judge Posner‘s restrictive preferences are widely known. He once
explained his reasons for denying an amicus brief, relying in part
on the word ―friend‖:
After 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast majority of
which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it would be
good to scrutinize these motions in a more careful, indeed a fisheyed, fashion.
The vast majority of amicus curiae briefs are filed by allies of litigants and duplicate the arguments made in the litigants‘ briefs, in
effect merely extending the length of the litigant‘s brief. Such amicus
briefs should not be allowed. They are an abuse. The term “amicus
curiae” means friend of the court, not friend of a party. We are beyond the original meaning now; an adversary role of an amicus curiae has become accepted. But there are, or at least there should be,
192
limits.

Judge Posner opined that amicus briefs should only be allowed
when a party is not represented competently or is not represented at
all, when the amicus has an interest in some other case that may be
affected by the decision in the present case (though not enough affected to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in the
present case), or when the amicus has unique information or perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for
193
the parties are able to provide.

Judge Posner‘s definition of amicus curiae would thus include
the Near Intervenor, but exclude the most common type of amicus
curiae—the Friend of a Party—unless that friend had unique information or perspective.194 In a 2003 case, Judge Posner, as Chief
190. FED. R. APP. 29(a).
191. See, e.g., Gidiere, supra note 62, at 1–2; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 745–
46 (explaining the varying judicial opinions on the importance of amicus curiae briefs and
noting the lack of judicial consensus on their role).
192. Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. This hostility toward Friend of the Party amicus is also reflected in Sierra Club,
Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2004):
The Chamber does not have ―an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action‖; its concern is not a legal ―interest‖
(the permit at stake affects only one power plant) but a political or program-
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Judge for the Seventh Circuit, denied permission for state legislators to file an amicus brief on the validity of a state statute.195
Judge Posner reasoned that the legislators did not represent the
state itself, and ―[t]he fact that powerful public officials or business or labor organizations support or oppose an appeal is a datum that is irrelevant to judicial decision making, except in a few
cases, of which this not one, in which the position of a nonparty
196
has legal significance.‖
Judge Posner‘s views found opposition from then-Third Circuit
Judge Samuel Alito, who explained that while traditional definitions of amicus curiae included the term ―impartial,‖ the current
197
rule required that the amicus have an ―interest‖ in the litigation and that such an interest—even a pecuniary interest—was
not inconsistent with the role of assisting the court in an adversary process.198 Moreover, Judge Alito noted that ―the time required for skeptical scrutiny of proposed amicus briefs may equal,
if not exceed, the time that would have been needed to study the
briefs at the merits stage if leave had been granted.‖199 Screening
is just not worth the effort. Under this view, amicus curiae participation need not be policed, no matter what type of amicus curiae
is involved.
Most federal appellate judges are not concerned about amicus
curiae abuse. The rate of amicus curiae participation is actually
not great. Then-Judge Alito pointed out that amicus curiae were
hardly overwhelming the courts of appeals. He noted that less
than 10% of cases that resulted in opinions (in itself a small portion of the total number of cases) had even one amicus brief
filed.200 A survey of federal appellate judges showed that around
matic one: the Chamber favors more business and less environmental regulation. That does not justify intervention. Indeed, it does not necessarily justify
even a filing as amicus curiae. Courts value submissions not to see how the
interest groups line up, but to learn about facts and legal perspectives that
the litigants have not adequately developed.
195. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 543–46 (7th Cir. 2003).
196. Id. at 545.
197. FED. R. APP. 29.
198. Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm‘r, 293 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2002).
199. Id. at 133; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (rejecting an amicus brief by retired federal judges).
200. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133 n.2 (―During the past year, private amici
were listed as appearing in fewer than 10% of our court‘s opinions in the Federal Reporter.
And since (a) the great majority of our cases are decided without such opinions and (b)
amici are much more likely in the sort of cases that do result in Federal Reporter opinions,
the percentage of all of our cases in which private amici appear or seek to appear is plainly
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80% believed that amicus briefs were filed in 5% or less of their
cases.201 Only twelve circuit court judges believed that 15% or
more of their cases involved amicus curiae.202
3. State Courts
All state courts allow amicus briefs in their courts of last resort. Many state court rules or statutes are modeled after Rule 37
of the Rules of the Supreme Court or Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
203
of Appellate Procedure. But the state rules vary in ways that
show different visions and concerns about amicus briefs. For the
most part, the rules are relaxed and do not distinguish between
types of friends, but there are a few exceptions.
A person or group receives permission to file an amicus brief
when appointed at the court‘s request, when all parties consent,
or when the person or group‘s motion to file a brief is granted.204
All three routes to permission can be followed in the federal
courts. In the state courts, around fifteen states allow amicus curiae to file with the consent of the parties or by court permission,205 but most refer only to the permission or leave of the
court.206 In Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas, the rules appear to
give amicus curiae the right to file a brief without advance permission, although the Texas court can refuse the brief ―for good
cause shown.‖207 Regardless of what the rules say, courts always
retain inherent power to appoint amicus curiae.
For applicants who must seek permission by motion to appear
as amicus curiae, the rules are mostly general about the necessary showing. The most common statement of the applicant‘s
showing is borrowed from Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of the Appellate Procedure, that the motion must ―identify the interest of
only a small fraction of 10%.‖).
201. Simard, supra note 3, at 686.
202. Id. at 686–87.
203. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 205–07.
205. See ALASKA R. APP. P. 212(a)(9); ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16(a); IOWA R. APP. P.
6.906(1); ME. R. APP. P. 9(e)(1); MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.05(f); NEV. R. APP. P. 29(a); N.H. SUP.
CT. R. 30(1); OHIO APP. R. 17; OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.12(a); R.I. SUP. CT. R. 16(h); VT. R. APP.
P. 29(a); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:30(b)(2); WASH. R. APP. P. 10.6(a); W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(a).
206. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f); COLO. APP. R. 29; DEL. SUP. CT. R. 28(a); MASS. R.
APP. P. 17; TENN. R. APP. P. 31(a).
207. GA. SUP. CT. R. 23; PENN. R. APP. P. 531(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 11.
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the applicant, and shall state the reasons why the brief of an
amicus curiae is desirable.‖208 A few states add criteria to these
required showings such as stating ―why the matters asserted are
209
relevant to the disposition of the case‖ or ―that the applicant
has read the relevant brief, petition or motion.‖210 A number of
states provide no required showing in their court rule,211 although
court decisions in those states may limit amicus curiae participa212
tion.
Some states require more specificity in the application about
the issues to be addressed. Examples of what court rules require
a petitioner to state include: matters of fact or law that might
213
otherwise escape the court‘s attention; facts or questions of law
that have not been, or reasons for believing that they will not adequately be, presented by the parties and their relevancy to the
disposition of the case;214 facts or questions of law which may not
be presented adequately by the litigants;215 and specific issues to
which the amicus curiae brief will be directed, and an applicant‘s
reason for believing that additional argument is necessary on
these specific issues.216 These rules suggest an effort to discourage
―me too‖ Friend of a Party briefs.
A few states require additional information about the applicant‘s interest in the case, in what seems to be an effort to tease
out the private and public interests involved. Minnesota, for example, seeks to know whether the interest is public or private.217
New Jersey asks to know the issue to be addressed, ―the nature of
the public interest therein and the nature of the applicant‘s spe208. ALA. R. APP. P. 29; ALASKA R. APP. P. 212(9); COLO. APP. R. 29; ME. R. APP. P. 9
(e)(1); MASS. R. APP. P. 17; OHIO APP. R. 17; R.I. SUP. CT. R. 16(h); S.C. APP. CT. R. 213;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-26A-74 (2014); see also CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 67-7 (2014 ed.);
NEV. R. APP. P. 29(c); UTAH R. APP. P. 25; VT. R. APP. P. 29(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 809.19(7)
(West 2014) (with very slight modifications of the text).
209. DEL. S. CT. R. 28(b)(2); N.D. R. APP. P. 29(b)(2); W.VA. R. APP. P. 30(c).
210. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16(a).
211. See HAW. R. APP. P. 28(g); KAN. SUP. CT. R. 6.06; NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-109; PA.
R. APP. P. 531; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:30.
212. See, e.g., In re Scheidmantel, 868 A.2d 464, 478 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (―An amicus
curiae is not a party and cannot raise issues which have not been preserved and raised by
the parties themselves.‖).
213. LA. SUP. CT. R. 7:12; see MISS. R. APP. P. 29(a).
214. MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.05(f); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 30(2).
215. OKLA. SUP. CT. R. 1.12(b)(2).
216. WASH. R. APP. P. 10.6(b)(3), (4).
217. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.01.
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cial interest, involvement or expertise in respect thereof.‖218 Oregon asks the applicant to explain whether it ―intends to present a
private interest of its own, or to present a position as to the correct rule of law that does not affect a private interest of its
219
own.‖ But these rules do not suggest that a private interest disqualifies an application for amicus curiae status. They do not actually articulate a distinction between the Near Intervenor and
the Friend of a Party amicus curiae, but come close.
A few states set forth a more restrictive list of criteria.220 The
Mississippi and Louisiana rules require would-be amicus curiae
to show:
(1) amicus has an interest in some other case involving a similar
question; or (2) counsel for a party is inadequate or the brief insufficient; or (3) there are matters of fact or law that may otherwise escape the court‘s attention; or (4) the amicus has substantial legitimate interests that will likely be affected by the outcome of the case
and which interests will not be adequately protected by those al221
ready parties to the case.

The Wyoming rule requires a similar showing, except that the
factors are joined by ―and‖ rather than ―or‖:
(1) the movant‘s interest in the issues raised in the case;
(2) the reasons an amicus brief is appropriate and desirable;
(3) the view of the movant with respect to whether a party is not represented competently or is not represented at all;
(4) the interest of the amicus in some other case that may be affected
by the decision in the case before the court; and
(5) any unique information or perspective the amicus has that can be
of assistance to the court beyond that the lawyers for the parties can
222
provide.

A number of state courts, like the Supreme Court of the United
States, require disclosure of financial or other ties to the parties.
For example, the comments to the Arizona rules state that amici
curiae should ―identify every person or entity, other than the
amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief.‖223 Cali218. N.J. GEN. R. 1:13-9(a).
219. ORE. R. APP. P. 8.15(1).
220. These criteria have been in use for some time in other contexts. See, e.g., Ryan v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
221. MISS. R. APP. P. 29; LA. SUP. CT. R. 7.
222. WYO. R. APP. P. 7.12(b) (emphasis added).
223. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt., amended by 2014 Ariz. Ct. Order 0033 (effective
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fornia requires amici to disclose any party or counsel for a party
who authored all or part of the brief, and every person—including
parties or parties‘ counsel—who made a financial contribution to
224
the preparation of the brief. Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia require similar disclosure.225 Such disclosure may unmask the party in amicus curiae
disguise, or at least diminish the credibility of a paid supporter.
Even states with rules that do not explicitly require disclosure
of financial support or ties to a party may expect such disclosure
by amicus applicants. Massachusetts, which does not include
such disclosure requirements in its rule, has such a requirement
226
by case law. The court noted that because the rule required an
amicus curiae to ―identify its interest,‖ the authors of an amicus
brief should have disclosed that the law firm representing amicus
curiae was also representing one of the parties in another case
with similar issues.227 Many states have language similar to the
Massachusetts rule,228 and one could argue that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts‘ broad reading of ―interest‖ should
apply to those states. But parties who are funding amicus curiae
briefs, or parties‘ counsel who are writing amicus briefs, are unlikely to read the language that way.
Arizona goes further than most states in requiring not only financial disclosure, but also that ―[c]ounsel for a party should not
be permitted to write the amicus brief in whole or in part.‖229 Arizona‘s rules and comments suggest suspicion of amicus curiae—a
suspicion that not all have friendly intentions—and a belief that
amicus curiae should be helpful to the court ―[a]s the name implies.‖230

Jan. 1, 2015).
224. CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f)(4).
225. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 67-7 (2014 ed.); MD. R. 8-511(b)(1)(E); MINN. R. CIV. APP.
P. 129.03; N.D. R. APP. P. 29(c)(4); TEX. R. APP. P. 11; W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(e)(5).
226. Compare MASS. R. APP. P. 17, (containing no disclosure requirement), with Aspinall v. Phillip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 480 n.8 (Mass. 2004) (―A full and honest
disclosure of the interest of amici is crucial to the fairness and integrity of the appellate
process . . . [W]e now interpret Rule 17 [of the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure] to require this making the disclosure.‖).
227. See Aspinall, 813 N.E. 2d at 480 n.8.
228. See supra note 208.
229. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt.
230. Id.
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Just as state court rules for amicus curiae vary, state court
judges have expressed varying views on the merits of amicus participation. Like Judge Posner, a few state courts appear to be hostile to the Friend of the Party amicus and recur to the meaning of
231
―friend of the court.‖ For example, the comments to Arizona
Rule 16 state, ―As the name implies, an amicus curiae brief should
232
assist the Court, not advocate a particular litigant‘s case.‖ More
commonly, states stress that the function of an amicus curiae is
to assist the court, not a party, although they acknowledge ―the
reality that most amicus briefs are in fact a type of adversary in233
tervention rather than objective assistance to the court.‖ Several Illinois cases state that an amicus curiae is not a party to the
action but is, instead, a friend of the court. Accordingly, its ―sole
function [as] an amicus is to advise or to make suggestions to the
court.‖234 These comments show the courts referring back to the
meaning of the term amicus as ―friend‖ in their attempts to limit
or shape amicus curiae participation.
Some states express concern about persons or groups masquerading as amicus curiae when they actually have an interest in the
outcome of litigation or close ties to one of the parties. As one
Massachusetts opinion put it: ―Briefs of amicus curiae are intended to represent the views of non-parties; they are not intended as
vehicles for parties or their counsel to make additional arguments
beyond those that fit within the page constraints of their
235
briefs.‖ Similarly, the comments to Rule 129.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure state that ―[t]his rule is intended to encourage the participation of independent amici, and
to prevent the courts from being misled about the independence
of amici or being exposed to ‗a mirage of amicus support that really emanates from the petitioner‘s word processor.‘‖236
231. See, e.g., Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th
Cir. 1997); Gabriel Tech. Corp., v. Qualcomm Inc., 2012 WL 849167, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
1, 2012).
232. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. (emphasis added).
233. ALA. R. APP. P. 29, cmt.; TENN. R. APP. P. 31, cmt.
234. See, e.g., In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 760–61 (Ill. 2003); Burger v. Lutheran Gen.
Hosp., 759 N.E.2d 533, 557 (Ill. 2001).
235. Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 813 N.E.2d 476, 480–81 n.8 (Mass. 2004).
236. MINN. R. APP. P. 129.01 Advisory Committee Comments (2000 Amendments); see
also Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket,
MAYER BROWN (1999), http://appellate.net/articles/certpractice.asp (last visited Nov. 24,
2014) (arguing that amicus briefs should not mislead courts, but rather add relevant information and reflect an independent perspective).
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One way to prevent parties from appearing in amicus curiae
clothing is to require a certification of independence or financial
disclosure. Only a minority of states require the kind of disclosure
of financial ties to the parties that is required in the Supreme
237
Court. Requiring disclosure and/or certification would do much
to expose this type of abuse, if not curb it altogether.238
Some states use the amicus curiae status as a way to allow a
Near Intervenor to be heard, although courts do not seem to recognize that the Near Intervenor amicus is very different from the
239
Friend of a Party interest group. A New Jersey case suggests
that crime victims, while lacking standing to intervene on appeal
from defendant‘s conviction, might be able to file an amicus
240
brief. A New York court allowed a citizens group seeking to intervene in a case involving a town‘s authority to ban hydrofracking to participate as amicus curiae, but not to intervene.241 Some
state rules contemplate that amicus curiae might be a person or a
group likely to be affected by the outcome, but not so affected that

237.

SUP. CT. R. 37.6 provides:
Except for briefs presented on behalf of amicus curiae listed in Rule 37.4, a
brief filed under this Rule shall indicate whether counsel for a party authored
the brief in whole or in part and whether such counsel or a party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the
brief, and shall identify every person other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made such a monetary contribution. The disclosure
shall be made in the first footnote on the first page of text.
A number of states also require some disclosure of financial support and/or authorship.
ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt.; CAL. R. CT. 8.520(f)(4); CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 67-7 (2014
ed.); ID. APP. R. 8; MD. R. 8-511(b); MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 129.01; N.D. R. APP. P. 29(c); TEX.
R. APP. P. 11; W. VA. R. APP. P. 30(e); see Aspinall, 813 N.E.2d at 480–81 n.8.
238. Deterrence was certainly the hope behind the federal disclosure requirement.
The disclosure requirement, which is modeled on Supreme Court Rule 37.6,
serves to deter counsel from using an amicus curiae brief to circumvent page
limits on the parties‘ briefs. See Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th
Cir. 2003) (noting the majority‘s suspicion ―that amicus briefs are often used
as a means of evading the page limitations on a party‘s briefs‖). It also may
help judges to assess whether the amicus itself considers the issue important
enough to sustain the cost and effort of filing an amicus brief.
FED. R. APP. P. 29, Advisory Committee Notes—2010 Amendments; see SUP. CT. R. 37.6.
239. See infra notes 240–43.
240. State v. Tedesco, 69 A.3d 103, 109 (N.J. 2013).
241. ―Here, although members of [the citizens group] submitted affidavits identifying
effects that hydrofracking may have on their daily lives, these claimed impacts were largely speculative and failed to demonstrate a substantial interest in the outcome of the action
different from other residents of the Town.‖ Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden,
964 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), leave to appeal granted, 2013-604, 2013 WL
4562930 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
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they have standing as a party.242 These rules might allow amicus
curiae status, for example, if the would-be amicus curiae has
―substantial, legitimate interests that will likely be affected by
the outcome of the case and which interests will not be adequate243
ly protected by those already party to the case.‖
But in other states, amicus curiae status is denied precisely because a party is too close to intervenor status, and has no new in244
formation or perspective to offer. In these states, the concept of
amicus curiae as a friend to the court means that near interve245
nors will not probably qualify as amicus. For example, a Delaware court denied both intervenor and amicus curiae status to a
member of the class otherwise represented in the class action.246
Stressing that the court did not need such amicus curiae assistance in the particular case because the parties were wellrepresented, and the would-be amicus curiae had no new information or perspective to offer, the court said,
[Applicant‘s] interest in these proceedings, as set forth in its motion,
is not objective, unique, or related to a question of general public importance. Rather, [applicant‘s] interest is specific to its status as a
class member. To the extent that this case involves any issues of
general public importance, [applicant] has not indicated why those
issues will not be adequately addressed by the attorneys for the parties. Consequently, the record does not reflect that this is a case in
which the Court would benefit by additional assistance from [appli247
cant].

Thus, sometimes amici curiae and intervenors are seen as being at the opposite ends of a spectrum of direct involvement in the
case: amici curiae should be disinterested friends of the court,
while intervenors must have sufficient interest in the dispute to
be a party. Yet at other times, amicus curiae and intervenors are
seen as divided by a thin line: one who falls just short of that line
may not have sufficient interest to intervene but may file an ami242. 41 MASS. PRAC. SERIES, APP. P. § 5:26. This Near Intervenor amicus curiae is also
implied in Judge Posner‘s suggested factors for amicus, and has been a part of amicus curiae definitions for some time. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545
(7th Cir. 2003).
243. LA. SUP. CT. R. 7-12; MISS. R. APP. P. 29(a). Yet, a Mississippi court has interpreted this rule narrowly, denying amicus status to a realtor‘s association that failed to ―comply with [this] criteria.‖ Taylor v. Roberts, 475 So. 2d 150, 151–52 (Miss. 1985).
244. Accord Giammalvo v. Sunshine Mining Co., 644 A.2d 407, 410 (Del. 1994).
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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cus curiae brief.248 These different conceptions are not acknowledged or analyzed as such—all are subsumed under the idea of
―friend of the court.‖
It may be that courts are not bothered by the inconsistencies
resulting from having amicus curiae cover such different roles because courts can simply disregard troublesome or unhelpful amici
249
curiae. A study in 2006 surveyed the chief judge/justice and appellate court clerk of every state court of last resort as to the usefulness of amicus briefs. It found that most respondents are
―moderately supportive‖ of amicus curiae and that they estimated
250
amicus briefs to be useful 25% to 75% of the time. These judges
believed amicus briefs were most useful when articulating policy
251
considerations or social science evidence. And regardless of the
level of amicus curiae participation in their state, these judges
and clerks were satisfied with that level of participation.252 The
survey results suggest that while judges may occasionally be irritated by what they perceive as unhelpful amicus curiae, on the
whole they are happy to read (or at least skim) the additional
briefs. The survey also suggests that while courts might prefer a
certain type of amicus curiae contribution, they do not wish to
tightly constrain these friends or put up a bouncer and velvet
rope at the courthouse door.
Two articles discussed amicus curiae participation in single
states, both of which are considered to have high levels of amicus
briefing. One article surveyed Florida judges on the usefulness of
amicus briefs. Some of the judges complained that ―too many are
meaningless vanity efforts,‖ or ―just an echo‖ of the party brief.253
The chief judge at the time had adopted Judge Posner‘s view that
amicus briefs should be screened carefully for usefulness.254 But in
practice the Florida courts admitted amicus briefs without great
248. See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
249. Krislov referred to the amicus brief‘s ―delusive innocuousness, its seemingly static
function and terminology, taken together with the offhand manner of its usual use in
court . . . .‖ Krislov, supra note 4, at 694.
250. Corbally, Bross, & Flango, supra note 64, at 185 (―27 percent of the justices regarded fewer than a quarter influential, 32 percent considered between a quarter and one
half influential, and 36 percent considered between one half and three quarters influential.‖).
251. See id.
252. See id. at 187.
253. Walbolt & Lang, supra note 60, at 277.
254. Cf. id. at 298 (noting Florida courts‘ general allowance of amicus briefs notwithstanding opposition).
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scrutiny.255 Moreover, the article‘s survey of cases showed that
amicus curiae had often influenced decisions.256 Similarly, an article about amicus curiae in the New York Court of Appeals concluded that amicus participation had increased in recent decades
and that these briefs did have some effect on the disposition of
257
cases. But unlike Florida‘s chief judge, the New York Court of
258
Appeals sought to increase amicus curiae participation.
IV. THE LIMITS OF FRIENDSHIP: TOWARD A CLEARER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF AMICUS
As the foregoing section shows, there is something curious
about the way amici curiae are so lightly regulated, allowed to
wander into court at will, and potentially take control of cases at
the expense of litigants who will actually be bound by the court‘s
decision. Yet neither courts nor litigants seem particularly concerned about the amicus curiae role, even as it has expanded.
There is the occasional exasperated judicial complaint about useless, duplicative, amicus briefs. Nevertheless, judges, by and
large, seem to appreciate the option to consider amicus briefs, and
neither litigants nor lawyers have organized in protest.
Of course, the fact that few seem alarmed does not mean that
there is not a problem. The fact that courts and others have not
clearly distinguished between the different types of amicus curiae—other than to give the state most-favored-amicus status—has
led to some confusion and muddy reasoning. A recurring complaint about amicus curiae is that they may be merely paid help259
ers of a litigant. The credibility of all amicus curiae could be
helped if all courts adopted at least the disclosure requirements
of the federal courts. Courts worried about abuse by the ―puppets
of a party‖ could go as far as Arizona and forbid ghost-writing or

255. See id.
256. See id. at 299–300.
257. Matthew Laroche, Is the New York State Court of Appeals Still “Friendless?” An
Empirical Study of Amicus Curiae Participation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 701, 715, 725, 753 (2009).
258. See id. at 703 (―In December of 1988, the court even added a preamble to its weekly list of new filings which encourages the submission of amicus briefs.‖).
259. See, e.g., David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice: New Rules for Old Friends, 25
LITIG. 25, 28–29 (1999) (describing compensated amici as one of the ―perceived abuses in
amicus practice‖ and noting how Texas has enacted a financial disclosure provision in its
appellate rules to prevent such abuse). See also supra notes 103–05 and accompanying
text.
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funding of amicus briefs.260 More importantly, if amicus curiae
practice continues to grow in courts other than the Supreme
261
Court of the United States, courts and litigants should prepare
for the challenges this expansion will present.
The lack of clarity about the different roles of amicus curiae,
caused in part by the failure to distinguish between the various
kinds of friends, will make it difficult for courts to deal effectively
with an upsurge in amicus curiae participation that may be
headed for the federal and state appellate courts. Rather than
presiding over an unexamined transformation of appellate court
decision-making in imitation of the Supreme Court, these courts
should clarify the role and purpose of amicus curiae, as well as
the role of an appellate court in resolving disputes. At present,
there is general complacency about amicus curiae participation; a
sense that more is probably better and the courts can competently
262
separate the useful from the duplicative. But with some clarity
about the types and purposes of amicus curiae, courts might be in
a better position to establish limits that could improve amicus
participation and the resolution of disputes.
To clarify the role of amicus curiae, and especially the role of a
Friend of a Party, courts need to address the myth of disinterest
that is tied to the term ―friend of the court.‖ The idea that amicus
curiae should be impartial, despite a general recognition that
most amici curiae are supporting a party, persists. Second, to understand what legitimate interests amici curiae may have, courts
need to clarify their own role: Is a court decision more like a legislative decision so that courts should gather as many opinions, policy arguments, and factual inputs as possible? Or should they
limit this kind of input, as democratic as it might be, out of deference to the parties who will be bound by the decision? Is a court‘s
primary purpose to ―get the law right,‖ or is it to resolve a dispute?
A. The Myth of Disinterest
Although most modern judges admit that an amicus curiae will
usually be partisan, the idea that amicus should be ―disinterest260. See ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 16, cmt. to 1998 Amendments.
261. There are indications that it will continue to grow. See Yeager, supra note 109.
262. See, e.g., Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs
a New Deal, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1249 (2011) (noting and critiquing the Court‘s reliance
on amicus briefs in antitrust cases). See also supra note 19.
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ed‖ or at least not very partisan, persists. We see this idea in
Judge Posner‘s writing and elsewhere.263 One judge stated that
[h]istorically, amicus curiae is an impartial individual who suggests
the interpretation and status of the law, gives information concerning it, and advises the Court in order that justice may be done, rather than to advocate a point of view so that a cause may be won by
264
one party or another.‖

In fact, not too long ago, a complete lack of interest was seen as
disqualifying an amicus curiae applicant. Law professors, for example, might see their amicus curiae efforts rebuffed, although
now they are regular amicus curiae authors in the Supreme
265
Court. In 1957, the solicitor general issued a policy on the consent to amicus curiae participation:
The Department of Justice frowns upon the filing by amici with
merely an academic interest at one extreme, or those who merely
wish to engage in propaganda on the other. Consent is given ―where
the applicant has a concrete, substantial interest in the decision of
the case, and the proposed brief would assist the Court by presenting
relevant arguments or materials which would not otherwise be sub266
mitted.‖

Simply having an opinion, even a learned one, was not enough to
merit amicus curiae participation.267
Those who, like Judge Posner, nevertheless harken back to a
disinterest ideal seem to be saying that they want a true friend,
263. The Ninth Circuit countered this argument in Funbus Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Utils.
Comm‘n., 801 F.2d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 1986) (―[W]e have stated that there is no rule
that amici must be totally disinterested.‖).
264. Cmty. Ass‘n for Restoration of Env‘t (CARE) v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, 54 F. Supp.
2d 974, 975 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
265. See Franze & Anderson, supra note 170 (noting the frequency with which Supreme Court Justices cite law professors‘ amicus briefs). See generally Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting law
professors‘ amicus brief for lack of interest in the case).
266. Krislov, supra note 4, at 715 (emphasis added).
267. See id. This view was echoed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in 1983 when it rejected an amicus brief by law professors:
The law professors do not purport to represent any individual or organization
with a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter at issue, and give only
their concern about the manner in which this court will interpret the law as
the basis for their brief. Since there is no indication that the parties to the
law suit and those parties who have been granted leave to file a brief amicus
curiae will not adequately present all relevant legal arguments, there is no
persuasive reason to grant the motion.
Thornburgh, 699 F.2d at 645. Could it be that the rise of law professor briefs coincides
with the rise of law professors who have been appellate clerks? In this light, the amicus
brief is a continuation of the clerkship role.
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one who will help the Court rather than try to influence it. Yet
Judge Posner would also allow the Near Intervenor, who has a
clear private interest in the dispute and who has historically been
allowed to participate as amicus curiae.268 Those who claim to
want disinterested amicus curiae are really saying they want limits on certain amicus curiae.
The issue seems less to be interest or lack of interest than the
nature of that interest. The state and invited friends will certainly be interested, but the courts see those interests as presumably
legitimate. The Court‘s Lawyer amicus is assigned an interest by
269
270
the court. The Near Intervenor‘s interests are clear, and the
amicus curiae avenue for expressing those interests seems reasonable. Friends of a Party, or Independent Friends, however,
may have interests that the court finds intrusive or less relevant.271 The court may be hostile to some of those interests, or the
court may resent duplicative efforts on behalf of the parties.
One interesting example involves the role of amicus curiae in
so-called death penalty ―volunteer‖ cases, i.e., where a defendant
sentenced to death refuses to appeal or otherwise challenge the
sentence.272 The Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected an amicus
brief by a public defender association, reasoning that the court
was not required to ―grant a request to appear as amicus curiae if
the parties to a proceeding have taken nonadversarial positions
on an issue on which the person seeking to be admitted as an
amicus curiae takes an opposing view.‖273 Yet the Supreme Court
of South Dakota reached a contrary conclusion. The court appointed an attorney as amicus curiae to review the record and argue any potential issues when it became clear that the defendant‘s attorney had been instructed not to contest the sentence.274
268. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir.
1997).
269. See Krislov, supra note 4, at 720; see also supra Part II.B; supra notes 93–94.
270. See supra Part II.F; see also Justin Gunter, Standards for Third-Party Intervenors: Distinguishing Between Public-Law and Private-Law Intervention, 66 VAND. L. REV.
645, 657 (2013) (discussing Rule 24‘s requirement that proposed intervenors must claim
an interest in the action).
271. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
rejected an amicus curiae effort by attorneys representing the district court judge after the
appellate court reassigned the case to another trial court judge for the appearance of fairness reasons. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2013).
272. State v. Robert, 820 N.W. 2d 136, 140–41 & n.7 (S.D. 2012),
273. State v. Ross, 863 A.2d 654, 674 (Conn. 2005).
274. Robert, 820 N.W. 2d at 141.
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The court stated, ―This Court is aware of society‘s interest in the
constitutional imposition of the death penalty. This interest exists independent of the State‘s interest in punishing [defendant]
275
for his crimes.‖
On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Connecticut is surely
correct that one who has no concrete stake in the outcome should
not be allowed to interfere where the parties are in agreement.
On the other hand, one historical function of amicus curiae was to
prevent collusion by calling to the court‘s attention considerations
276
that the parties would not collude. And of course, the death
penalty is unique—the state has a particular interest in its fair
administration. The death penalty volunteer cases seem like a
paradigm example of appropriate amicus curiae participation,
whether or not the amicus is perceived as having an ―interest‖ in
the outcome. These are perhaps ideal cases for Invited or Independent Friends.
Viewing the question of the amicus curiae‘s interest in light of
the different types of amicus curiae shows that ―interest‖ becomes
a problem for some courts and litigants primarily in the Friend of
a Party category. The question then becomes not whether all amicus curiae should have an interest, but whether a Friend of a
Party‘s (or Independent Friend‘s) interest is one that justifies
amicus curiae participation. The answer to that question depends
in part on how a court views its own job.
B. Amicus Input and the Role of the Courts
There was a time, we are told, when courts were expected only
to apply the law, or to find it through an exercise in pure reason.277 Courts were not seen as making law.278 This caricature of
275. Id. (citation omitted).
276. See Krislov, supra note 4, at 695 (discussing the historical role of amicus curiae at
common law as a method for calling attention to manifest error or existing statutes); see
also Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1997)
(pointing out that the court is helped by amici curiae that bring to the court‘s attention
matters that the parties have omitted).
277. Helen A. Anderson, Legal Doubletalk and the Concern with Positional Conflicts: A
“Foolish Consistency”? 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 14 (2006).
278. Id. (―An early Nineteenth Century belief in natural law gave way to a classical
view of law as the objective application of known principles. Thus, judges were viewed as
constrained by rules, rules that could be determined correctly through reason.‖) (citing
Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 19–26 (David Kairys ed., 1982)).
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the judicial role may never have completely taken hold, yet nor
has it ever been entirely expunged. It survives in the popular
mind even today, as we see in the confirmation hearings for Su279
preme Court Justices. Few educated people today would argue
that judges do not make law. It may be that the rise in amicus
curiae involvement coincides with that recognition that courts
280
engage in policymaking just as legislatures do.
But to acknowledge that courts make the law is not to say that
they should operate just as legislatures do, with the explicit involvement of interest groups. Courts still deal with the law one
dispute at a time, with litigants who are bound by the decision,
who shape the course of litigation by their tactical and strategic
decisions, and who bear the costs of litigation. It is one thing to
say that a court—especially a high court—should consider the
impact of its decision in future cases. It is quite another to allow
the litigants‘ voices to be almost drowned out by those of amici
curiae.
Some might argue that certain kinds of cases need significant
amicus curiae input. They might point to ―public law [or interest]
litigation‖281 such as school desegregation cases and claim that
these are more like a legislative exercise, with many stakeholders
whose voices need to be heard.282 Even in these situations, however, those actually bound by the decision are represented in court
and can receive tactical and financial support from allies. Moreover, it is hard to draw a clear line between the public and private
dispute. A private dispute might be brought as a test case by an
279. At Chief Justice John Roberts‘ confirmation hearing, the judge compared himself
to an umpire, calling balls and strikes. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John
G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 59 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.) (―Judges are like
umpires. Umpires don‘t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a
judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.‖). During Justice Sonia Sotomayor‘s nomination hearing, she pledged to simply apply the law, and not be moved by empathy. See
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 59 (2009).
280. In fact, it is that recognition that prompted a call for New Zealand to allow amicus
curiae participation. See Clark, supra note 7, at 71–73.
281. See generally Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 282 (1989) (introducing ―public interest litigation‖ and
explaining its design in vindicating ―the ideological, political, or moral interests‖ of the
public and attempting to ensure that public institutions behave lawfully).
282. Id. at 284, 331.
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advocacy group in order to create favorable law.283 Or, a private
case such as a custody dispute can take on public importance if it
is seen as creating law for new domestic situations such as same284
sex parent couples. The parties to the dispute, whose motives
may be primarily private and personal, can find themselves the
center of amicus curiae attention.
Some courts actively seek amicus curiae, especially when presented with what they perceive to be a novel question.285 Judges
may like the assistance of amici curiae because it helps them feel
more assured about their decision, that they are not missing
something. It may also feed a sense of self-importance to know
that other organizations are concerned with the decision. To the
extent that concern inspires the court to do a careful job, that attention is not a bad thing. But can courts get carried away with
the importance of their policymaking roles? Intermediate appellate courts, especially, should be concerned with error correc286
tion.
A liberal amicus curiae approach is sometimes defended as
necessary for democratic input into the courts.287 But that argument seems to prove too much. If it is the democratic input we
value in amicus curiae, why require briefs at all? Why not allow
petitions and letters to be entered into the appellate record? Most
courts would reject that idea, sensing that such a policy would
undermine respect for the court‘s legal reasoning function.288 Requiring a brief with legal argument performs some gatekeeping
and emphasizes the importance of the law in the court‘s decisions.
And yet, imposing no limit on the number and content of amicus
curiae briefs can perhaps also undermine respect for the court‘s
283. See id. at 276 n.33.
284. See, e.g., In re Custody of A.F.J., 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013) (three organizations
filed amicus briefs in a dispute involving the custody of a child parented by a same-sex
couple).
285. It is easy to find examples of briefing invitations to amicus curiae by searching the
case law databases for ―amicus‖ in the same sentence as ―invitation‖ or ―invited‖. See, e.g.,
Perez v. State, 313 P.3d 862, 866, n.1 (Nev. 2013); Baily v. Schaaf, 812 N.W. 2d 770 (Mich.
2012); State v. White, 362 S.W. 3d 559, 565 (Tenn. 2012).
286. See Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century
Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459,460 (2009) (arguing that federal courts of appeals are
too enamored by their roles as law makers, and give error-correction short shrift, to the
detriment of criminal justice).
287. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 196–97; Garcia, supra note 2, at 346.
288. See Krislov, supra note 4, at 710–11 (discussing judicial hostility to letters and
telegrams received from the public in the 1940s and 1950s).
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role or at least confuse the public about what courts actually do.
If anyone can file a ―me-too‖ brief, it gives the impression that
anyone‘s opinion should matter to the court.
Such an impression might be particularly troublesome with respect to elected judges in state courts. Most of the time, judicial
races are sleepy affairs and often judges run unopposed.289 But in
290
recent decades, contested elections have become more common.
More money has become involved in judicial elections, with increased fundraising anxiety for judicial candidates.291 State judges
endeavor to balance their democratic obligations to the electorate
292
with their judicial role as neutral arbiters of the law. Increased
political pressure in particular cases in the form of amicus briefs
could upset that balance if there are no restraints whatsoever.
Of course, one might also argue that elected judges in particular should be sensitive to constituents‘ views, and therefore
greater amicus curiae participation should be allowed. And perhaps it is better to have the political pressure out in the open in
the form of amicus briefs, rather than through back channels or
television campaigns. Restricting amicus briefs—particularly
Friend of a Party briefs—is a tricky matter in elected courts. But
these courts would be warranted in putting some limits, especially on duplicative or ―puppet of a party‖ briefs, in order to emphasize the difference between judicial decision-making and legislative negotiation.

289. See Rachel P. Caufield, The Changing Tone of Judicial Election Campaigns as a
Result of White, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 34 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
290. See id. at 36–37.
291. For an example of the importance of money in state judicial elections, see Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 873, 884, 886–87 (2009) (holding that the
state court judge should have recused himself from the case when the CEO of a party gave
$3 million to his re-election campaign). Money, and out-of-state funding, are playing a
growing role in state judicial elections. Erik Eckholm, Outside Spending Enters Arena of
Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2014, at A12.
292. See Sorenson, supra note 8, at 1247–48 (discussing these pressures specifically in
Texas); ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC FINANCING OF
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 4, 9 (2002) (reaffirming that ―the states have long struggled to reconcile their commitment to electoral accountability with the need to preserve judicial independence[,]‖ and recommending the financing of state judicial elections with public funds
in order to reach the appropriate balance between a judge‘s commitment to electoral accountability and their role as a neutral arbiter).
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One can, therefore, make a principled argument that amicus
curiae should be limited, particularly in the Friends of a Party
and Independent Friends categories. A court of law is not the
court of public opinion. The parties should retain the right to
shape the litigation.
C. Reasonable Restrictions on Friend of a Party Amicus
Should courts wish to exercise their gatekeeping powers, there
are some simple steps they could take. This section focuses on
limits to Friend of a Party briefs, since these are the most numerous and likely to pose the greatest challenge. There are certainly
arguments for restricting other types of amicus briefs. The
Court‘s Lawyer type of amicus curiae, appointed to argue a position suggested by neither party, threatens to wrest the case from
293
the litigants even more than a Friend of a Party could. The
state, allowed to file a brief without consent or permission, now
has many actors participating as amicus curiae—agencies, chief
executives, legislators—who perhaps should not all be allowed to
speak for the state.294 But the greatest growth in amicus curiae
participation is in the Friend of a Party category.
In addition to requiring amicus curiae to disclose financial
support and/or ghostwriting by a party, as many courts already
do,295 courts concerned about amici curiae participation could return to the common law rationale for amicus curiae. A complete
absence of screening threatens to lead to absurd results, such as
experts who testify at trial and then attempt to file an amicus
brief on appeal,296 or a trial judge appearing as amicus curiae to
defend her reputation in the appellate court.297 To a large extent,
a return to the common law justifications for amicus could effectively restrict amicus participation to those with a special interest
or expertise. These criteria have been alluded to in the Supreme
293. See Goldman, supra note 19, at 914, 925, 942–45.
294. See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2003);
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1266, 1274.
295. FED. R. APP. P. 29; see supra notes 223–24 (financial disclosure) and 232–36
(ghostwriting disclosure).
296. See Witty v. Comm‘n & Town of Harland, 784 A.2d 1011, 1018 (Conn. App. Ct.
2001) (upholding trial court refusal to allow attorneys to testify as expert witnesses and
also file an amicus brief).
297. See Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 166, 168–69 ((2d Cir. 2013) (denying amicus status to lawyers for a district court judge whose case had been reassigned).
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Court‘s Northern Securities decision,298 and in Judge Posner‘s decisions.299 Some state court decisions and court rules also articulate these common law criteria. For example, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee explained:
As a general matter, appointing an amicus is reserved for rare and
unusual cases that involve questions of general or public interest. An
amicus can assist the court by (1) providing adversarial presentations when neither side is represented, (2) providing an adversarial
presentation when only one point of view is represented, (3) supplementing the efforts of counsel even when both sides are represented,
and (4) drawing the court‘s attention to broader legal or policy impli300
cations that might otherwise escape the court‘s consideration.

Similarly, the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure require
motions to file an amicus brief to state that
(1) amicus has an interest in some other case involving a similar
question; or (2) counsel for a party is inadequate or the brief insufficient; or (3) there are matters of fact or law that may otherwise escape the court‘s attention; or (4) the amicus has substantial legitimate interests that will likely be affected by the outcome of the case
and which interests will not be adequately protected by those al301
ready parties to the case.

These rules identify the Near Intervenor as a legitimate amicus curiae applicant and also permit amici curiae who truly have
something helpful to contribute, especially where the party representation is inadequate or where amicus stands to be indirectly
affected by the judgment. These rules do not insist on impartiality, nor do they suggest that a desire to weigh in is enough. Courts
concerned about an overload of amicus curiae could return to these criteria as a way to evaluate amicus curiae petitions. They
should not insist on impartiality or true friendship, concepts
which have distracted courts from the real roles of amicus curiae.
Not all courts have the resources or visibility of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Not all litigants in lower courts will
enjoy the expert volunteer assistance that litigants before the Supreme Court can obtain to deal with a multitude of amicus briefs.
298. See N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555, 555–56 (1903).
299. See, e.g., Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm‘n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th
Cir. 1997).
300. State ex rel. Comm‘r of Transp. v. Med. Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d
734, 758 (Tenn. App. 2001).
301. MISS. R. APP. P. 29(a); see also LA. SUP. CT. R. 7-12 (containing similar language).
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Some litigants may be unduly burdened by the involvement of
amicus curiae in their case. If amicus curiae begin to file in federal or state appellate courts at the rate they now do in the Supreme Court, these courts should consider limiting amicus curiae
out of consideration for litigants and the courts, as well as respect
for the judicial process.
CONCLUSION
The Friend of the Court has risen in prominence, and yet has
largely escaped scrutiny. The category of amicus curiae embraces
quite different types of actors. Courts, and the court rules that
govern amicus curiae participation, do not often distinguish between the Invited Friend, the Friend of the Party, or the Near Intervenor. All are ―friends,‖ and yet the term covers a range of
roles and types of input.
As the courts‘ recurring references to the meaning of ―friend of
the court‖ demonstrate, the very term and its friendly implications have helped mask these distinctions. Courts are remarkably
open to amicus curiae participation, despite the occasional expression of misgivings. The friendly connotations of the term, and
the Supreme Court‘s open-door policy, have established a norm of
hospitality for amicus curiae, even as rules of joinder, intervention, party status, and standing have grown more constraining on
others who wish to participate in appellate cases.
Although the state appellate courts do not seem to be all that
restrictive of amicus curiae, they do wrestle with some of the contradictions of a category of friends that includes very interested
Near Intervenors, Friends of a Party, the Court‘s Lawyer, and
advocacy groups not tied to a party.302 If amicus curiae participation continues to grow, especially in certain states, these jurisdictions may want to take a closer look at the guest list. The opendoor policy that works for the Supreme Court of the United States
may not be advisable for courts with fewer resources and especially courts subject to direct democratic pressure.
Yet on the whole, judges—even those with the greatest number
of amicus filings—do not seem overly concerned about amici curiae abuse of their positions. This indifference may result in part
302.

See supra Part III.B.3.
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from the very flexibility of the amicus curiae category. Not only is
the term flexible enough to cover a range of friends, but the
courts have great flexibility in dealing with the briefs.303 Judges
are free to use, rely on, quote, discard, or ignore the presentations
of amicus curiae. Because amici curiae have no right to have their
arguments addressed, they can remain a pleasant-sounding,
loosely defined category—as loosely defined as the term ―friend‖
in everyday life.
But although judges may believe that they can sort through an
increase in amicus curiae filings, their sense of control may be illusory. Studies have shown that amicus briefs are influential in
304
court decisions. Courts should take a closer look at the different
roles of amici curiae and consider whether it is time to put some
restrictions on their friendship.

303. See supra Part III.
304. See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 15, at 745–48 (providing an empirical
study of the impact of amicus briefs on the Supreme Court of the United States); see also
Sungaila, supra note 110, at 33–34 (citing various studies on the subject in both the Supreme Court and in state supreme courts).

